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ABSTRACT 
This research aims (within a strictly Piagetian frame-
work) toward the development of a programme of inter-
vention which will facilitate cognitive development, 
conceptual change and scientific literacy for those 
individuals who experience difficulty in coping with 
contemporary scientific and technological concepts. 
The research focuses specifically on the development of 
a diagnostic battery useful for realising a conceptual 
profile of the individual. This profile would indicate 
personal areas of functional interests that can be used 
creatively as a starting point for the facilitation of 
cognitive growth. The goal of such a programme is not 
the acceleration of cognitive growth, but rather the 
restoration of the individual to the mainstream of 
transactions in which the process of growth can flourish. 
The proposed facilitatory programme makes use of Piagetian 
tasks in a voluntary, individualist mode of instruction 
comparable to recently developed techniques of scientific 
education programmes. 
In brief, this research analyses three specific areas: 
1) The development of a body of theory that 
... /can 
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can assist in the development of such a 
facilitato~y programme, 
2) The development of a diagnostic battery to 
provide insight into the individual's level 
of conceptual development, 
3) The realization of certain guidelines for 
an instructional procedure whereby facili-
tation of growth can begin . 
The experiment takes the form of a pilot study of 
twentyfo ur black and white subjects, exploring whether 
the battery of Piagetian tasks reveals a profile of 
conceptual development of the individual. 
Unique conceptual profiles were realized for all indi-
viduals, with evidence pointing towards the existence 
of a relationship between functional interests and the 
more advanced areas of the individual's conceptual 
development. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
AN OVERVIEW OF JEAN PIAGET'S THEORY OF 
COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT. 
- 1 -
1. PIAGET'S THEORY OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
The one -cell ed a nim a l responds to its e n vi ro nmen t in 
a very limited way, whi ls t the complex ani mal at the 
expense of biological simplicity enjoys more 'flex-
ibility' being composed of many complex interr0 1ated 
parts - some being specialised for the reception of 
informa tion from the environment, whilst others for 
action on the environment. In adjusting and adapting 
to the environment the animal survives. However, not 
only a re parts needed for the reception of information , 
and f o r acting on the environment, but also a 'mediating 
system' that can integrate the activities of these parts. 
Once an organism has developed this 'mediating system', 
the path is open to the devel opment- of a lterna tive 
arrangements of behaviour. Thus, an individual's 
behaviour is influenced both by the reception of infor-
mation and by the way his 'medi a ting system' o r central 
organising processes, are structured a nd organised. 
Piaget's genetic epistomology is to be seen as a cogni-
tive rather than an associativistic theory, concerning 
itself with the central organising processes in cog ni-
tive development of higher a nimals in such a way that 
the a nimal becomes a n ac tor rather than simply a re-
actor to its e nviron ment. Piaget's theory is seen as 
. ./ 'tinteractioni st '· 
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Ilinteractionist" or "constructivist" in that the 
o rgani sm inherits a genetic programme providing it 
with the biological potentials and equipment nece-
ssary (via a process of maturation) to gradually en-
able the organism to contruct a 'stable' internal 
structure - or "intelligence" - which then paradoxical-
ly assists the organism to adapt to the changes in 
its environment, the consequences of which may in-
fluence the organism towards further de velopment . 
Piaget thus parallels organic life with in celligence, 
and phylogeny with ontology insofar as they are all 
biological functions involving adaptation and organ-
isation. 
1.1 ADAPTATION 
Every living organism must be adapted to its environ-
ment for it to survive. To achieve this adaptation 
it must both assimilate its environment and accommo-
date to it. Assimilation can mean, biologically, 
taking in food and nutrients from the environment in 
order to maintain life. However, this process would 
prove futile if the organism we r e not able to make 
use of these nutrients towards an appropriate end 
such as producing energy and growth. In order that 
... /the 
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the organism may make successful use of assimilated 
nutrients, the structure and the function of the 
organism must be adjusted or accommodated. In other 
words, by accommodating itself, the organism must have 
the working apparatus to assimilate . Thus, accommo -
dation always involves the potential to modify the 
internal structure in such a way that the assimilatory 
process may continue, a l lowing survival in accordance 
with the immediate environmental contingencies. 
"Ve r y generally, assimilation is what the 
organism has to do to remai n alive and 
accommodation is how i t does it . Ye t 
it must be emphasised that these are 
only concept s , for in practise the two 
p r ocesses can never be separated. 
Adaptation prevails when there is a state 
of equilibrium between these two such t hat 
an organism, or a species, has its assimi-
latory needs balanced by its accommoda-
tory capacities. " (Russell, 1978 , p.93). 
Piaget describes cognitive development ' IS a process 
of adaptation to the environment through the organ-
isation of experiences. Knowledge in Piagetian 
. .. / terms 
- 4 -
terms is not a copy of reality, but the result of an 
operation - it is based on action. 
"To know an object, to know an event, 
is not simply to look at it and make 
a mental copy or image of it. To 
know is to modify, to transform the 
object, and to understand the process 
of this transformation, and as a con-
sequence to unders t and the way the 
object is constructed. An operation 
is thus the essence of knowledge; it 
is an interiorised action which modifies 
the object of knowledge." 
(Piaget, 1964, p.176) 
Cognitive development, then arises out of an adaptive 
interaction between the organism and the environment, 
controlled by assimilation and accommodation. In 
other words, an individual gains knowledge of the 
world by acting upon the objects of the world and 
discovering the relationships and properties of these 
objects. These actions are interiorised and assimi-
lated into a general strategy of action, or cognitive 
structure, whilst at the same time these structures 
must be accommodated to the assimilated information . 
. . . / If 
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If the structures are not accommodated towards allow-
ing the information to be assi mi lated, the individual 
experiences himself to be in a state of 'imbalance ' -
or in practical terms, unable to understand the infor-
mation - and he will then attempt to reorg an ise 
( ac commodate) his cogniti ve structures in suc h a way 
that the information can be assimilated; thus ad apt-
ing to the environmental contingencies. It can be 
seen then that cognitive development is not a n auto -
matic process, for the individual is continually 
actively correcting and restructuring his plans and 
categories. 
Assimilation and accommodation are always pushing in 
opposite directions with assimilation being conserva-
tive, structuring the present in terms of past ex-
periences, whilst accommodation is innovative, re -
structuring the present and thus influencing future 
development. As Russell (1978) points out, intellec-
tual adaptation begins via the processes of ass imila-
tio n but is only a ble to succeed by v irtue of accommo -
dation. 
1.2 ORGAN ISATI ON 
A further biological func tion that Piaget parallels 
... /with 
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with intelligence is the notion of organisation, with-
out which adaptation could not take place. O"rganisa-
tion involves the relating of parts to the whole in 
such a way that one part is responsible for the success-
ful functioning of the whole, and the continued function-
ing of the part is dependent upon the functioning of 
the whole. For example, a vital organ in the body, if 
removed causes death, but can only continue to function 
itself if all the other organs of the body cooperate 
and support it. Similarily with cognition - every 
structure that is constructed is in some way related 
to all other cognitive structures that have been 
created, and intelligent behaviour depends upon the 
interrelations of these structures. 
Piaget points out that although an interiorised action 
(an operation) makes up the logical structures, it is 
a particular kind of action - a reversible action -
which can take place in both directions. For 
instance, adding or subtracting, joining or separating. 
Operations can never be isolated, but are always 
linked to other operations and consequently the 
operation is always a part of a total structure. 
Logical class, for instance, does not exist in 
... /isolation 
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isolation, but exists within the total structure of 
classification. Thus, as these operational structures 
constitute the basis of knowledge, the central problem 
of development is to understand the formation, the 
el aboration, the organisation and the functioning of 
these structures. 
1.3 FOUR MAJOR FACTORS OF DEVELOPME NT 
Piaget calls on four major factors to help explain 
development from one set of structures to another. 
These being firstly, maturation, since this develop-
ment is a continuation of the embryogenesis; secondly, 
the role of experience of the physical environment and 
its effects on the structures of intelligence; thirdly, 
social transmission in the form of linguistic trans-
mission, education and social interaction; and 
fourthly, the factor of equilibration or self-regula-
tion. 
1.3.1 MATURATION 
Pi aget, following the 'organic lamp' tradition uses the 
term "maturation" to refer to a gradually unfolding 
genetic plan, the genetic influences on development. 
Maturation thus becomes the development and realisation of 
... /potentials 
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potentials that are of genetic origin. Maturation 
however, does not explain everything because the 
average (chronological) ages at which the various 
stages of development appear tend to vary a great 
deal from one culture to another. However, the 
ordering of these stages appears to be constant. 
Al-Fakhri (1977, p.203) states that; 
"The sequence of stages (Piagetian) 
revealed in most of the studi e s is similar 
al l ove r the world; however, differences 
have been noted i n the onset of each stage 
in the various cultures. " 
1.3.2. EXPERIENCE OF OBJECTS 
Experience of objects, of the physical reality, is 
obviously a basic factor in the development of cog-
nitive structures . However, this factor also does 
not explain everything, as t here are some concepts 
which appear at the beginning of the stage of concrete 
operations that could not be drawn from experience. 
For instance, the child attains a notion of substance 
before either weight or volume. Piaget claims that 
this conservation of substance could not come from 
... /mere 
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perception, as perception can get at the weight or 
volume of an object, but cannot give an idea of the 
amount of substance. Piaget claims that this concer-
vation of substance is simply a matter of logical 
necessity. Piaget states; 
"He (the child) knows that something is 
conserved but he does not know what. It 
is not weight, it is not yet the volume; 
it is simply a logical form - a logical 
necessity. There, it seems to me, is an 
example of a progress in knowledge, a 
logical necessity for something to be 
conserved even though no experience can 
have lead to this notion." (Piaget, 1964. p.179). 
Most importantly, Piaget points out that t here are 
two kinds of experience which are psycho l ogically 
very different, and this is particularly significant 
from the pedagogical point of view. The first kind 
of experience is the physical experience of the 
world - consisting of acting on objects and drawing 
out knowledge about the objects by abstracting from 
the objects. The sec ond form of experience Piaget 
calls logico-mathematical experience, where knowledge 
... / is 
- 10 -
not drawn from objects, but is drawn from the actions 
exerted on the objects. Actions transform and modify 
the object, although the object still remains there. 
Piaget gives an example of this by showing how on e of 
his children was putting pebbles into various arrange-
ments and counting them, discovering in the end that 
the number of pebbles remained constant. According 
to Piaget t he child discovered in this inst anc e not 
a property of the pebbles, but rather a property of 
the action of ordering - that the sum was independent 
of the order - and to make a sum an action was nece-
ssary; the operation of putting together a nd counting. 
The properties of the actions carried out on objects 
constituting another form of experience, is to Pi aget, 
the point of departure of mathematical deduction. 
Piaget does not believe that l og ic is a derivative 
of language, but rather a derivative of this logico-
mathematical experience. It is a derivative of the 
total coordination of the subject's actions, actions 
upon objects of joining, ordering and se p a r ati ng e tc . 
Thus what is needed for the growt h of logic is an 
experience of the actions of the subjec t, and not a n 
experience of the objects themselves. This experience 
is of vital necessity before operations c a n be c on-
... / structed. 
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structed. Furthermore, once the operations have 
been constructed the experience is no l o nger ne eded, 
and the co-ordination of the actions can take place by 
themselves v ia deduction a nd construction, as occurs 
with abstract structures. 
1.3.3. SOCIAL TRANSMISSION 
Although Piaget does not deny the role played by 
social, linguistic and educational transmission, he does 
see social transmission of knowledge as only playing 
a small part in the cognitive development of the 
individual. To Piaget, the child can only receive 
valuable information via language or education if he 
is in a state of development where he can understand 
that information. In other words, in or e er to 
receive information, the child must have already 
existing a cognitive structure which enables him to 
assimilate the infor mation. Furthermore, the child 
must have acti vely constructed the structure for him-
self, or the information becomes meaningless. Thus 
one cannot teach higher mathematics to a five y ear 
old child - he does not have the structure that en-
ables him to understand. 
. .. / Rotman 
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Rotman (1977) points out that Piaget sees logic or 
mathematics as an individual rather than a social 
creation. In addition, he argues that Piaget claims 
that his theory of mind is a new 'third way', that 
sees our mental capacities as neither innate nor the 
result of social transmission, but as developing in 
a necessary and logical way, that is the same for all 
of us. Social cooperation thus becomes no more than 
the coordination of interpersonal actions - this being 
made possible by the process of decentering, where the 
individual achieves objectivity by transcending his 
own viewpoint. Rotman states that 
"By reducing the contribution society makes 
to the formation of logic in this way Piaget 
once more rescues his individualism . But 
in a slightly modified way, since the con-
flation of the inter-personal means that the 
individual has become societised. More 
importantly, it also means that society 
has become individualised." (Rotman, 1977, p.166) 
1.3.4. EQUILIBRATION 
According to Piaget, 
... /'1 ... in 
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" in the act of knowing, the subject 
is active, and consequently, faced with an 
external disturbance, he will react in order 
to compensate and consequently he will tend 
towards equilibrium. Equilibrium, defined 
by active compensation, leads to reversibility." 
(Piaget, 1964, p.1Sl). 
Equilibrium is an active, dynamic process; it is a 
process of self-regulation - a process that is funda-
mental to development. Equilibrium regulates develop-
ment by a progressive compensation of systems. Piaget 
points out that the process of equilibration takes the 
form of a succession of levels of equilibrium , of 
levels that have a sequential probability - there is 
a sequence of stages or levels and it is not possible 
to reach the second level unless equilibrium has been 
achieved at the first level. Each level Piaget 
determines as being the most probable given that the 
preceding level has been reached. 
Equilibration, then, can be seen as a dynamic process 
contin ually moving towards maintaining a steady state 
of affairs between the interior system of the organism 
and its external environment. Structures are 
•.. /continually 
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continually moving towards equilibrium, and o nce 
equilibrium is reached the structure becomes more 
developed, sharper and more clearly delineated tha n 
it was previously; thus the ac tivities of the 
developing individual are continuously directed 
towards reducing the gaps and inconsistencies within 
the structure that were ne ve r salient previously. 
However, this very development points out furthe r gaps 
and inconsistencies which consequently leads to a 
further need for equilibrium to be realised at a 
higher level - thus forcing development forward. 
Equilibrium, although always dynamic, is never 
absolutely realised. It is the outcome of each 
progressive stage of development, with the final stage 
(formal operations) being a relatively equilibrated 
system of actions. Operational reversibility is a 
model of an equilib rated system where a transformation 
in one direction is compensated by a transformation 
in the other direction. 
1.4 THE DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES 
It is important to note that Piaget separates the 
problem of development from the problem of learning. 
Piaget sees development as a process which concerns 
the totality of the structure of knowledge, whilst 
... / l earning 
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learning is provoked by specific situations. 
states; 
Piaget 
"It is (learning), prevoked, in general 
as opposed to spontaneous. In addition 
it is a limited process - limited to a 
single problem or to a single structure." 
(Piaget, 1964, p.176). 
Thus, according to Piaget, development explains 
learning and learning only occurs as a function of 
development. Development is not a sum of many learn-
ing experiences. Knowledge and cognitive development 
arise out of the individual interior ising his actions 
on the world into tightly organised substructures or 
schemes, in such a manner that the property of the 
action can be generalised to other contents. These 
schemes are tightly organised into cognitive struc-
tures; there can be interactions between these 
schemes, i.e. they can assimilate or accommodate 
each other. The most simple schemes can be seen as 
reflexes, whilst the later more complex schemes can 
be seen as transformation rules, plans or strategies. 
Essentially they form a fr a mework into which incoming 
information from the environment can be fitted. Thus 
..• (schemes 
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schemes are firstly concerned with action on objects, 
then with the construction of intellectual operations 
from these actions and consequently with the relation-
ships between these operations. Thus according to 
Piaget, every thought has resulted from reflective 
abstractions of actions, and the study of intellectual 
development is the establishment of the relationships 
by which new schemes are constructed. 
Piaget describes mental development in terms of 
operations. These operations initially occur, in 
concrete terms t o be followed by symbolic representa-
tions as individuals begin to classify and unders t and 
objects and events in their environment. Piaget 
divides mental development into four major periods 
(stages) that are each related to age. 
Phillips (1969) points out that the concept of stages 
can be useful if three things are borne in mind. 
These are (1) that different children may pass 
through the sequence of stages at different rates, 
(2) that each stage is named for the particular 
process that has most recently become operative, 
even though others may occur at the same time in 
their original form, and (3) that each stage is 
... /marked 
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marked by the formation of a total structure that 
includes its predecessors within it as necessary sub-
structures. Cognition thus advances only by building 
on and extending all that has already been developed. 
As development is marked by a striving towards the 
realisation of equilibrium, so the inability to achieve 
equilibrium - or the continual experience of disequili-
brium marks pathology. 
Piaget states that the child moves from one stage to 
another via the interaction of the four major factors 
mentioned previously i.e. maturation, experience of 
physical objects, social transmission and equilibration. 
Each stage is individually characterised by a specific 
style of thought, but Piaget does emphasise that it is 
not so much the stages that are important, but rather 
all that happens in the transition from one stage to 
another. There are no 'static' stages, for each 
stage is the fulfilment of something that was begun in 
the preceding stage, and is the beginning of something 
that will lead onto the next stage. 
1.4.1 THE SENSORY-MOTOR STAGE (BIRTH-2YRS) 
There are obviously many differences between the new-
. .. /. born 
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born infant and the 2-year- o ld child, and consequently 
Piaget divides this period into six substages. The 
totally dependent, preverbal child becomes by the age 
of 2, a child who can communicate (albeit understanding 
far more than what he can say) and who can move around 
independently. However, these differences are marked 
by certain similarities, for during this enti re period 
behaviour is dictated by the senses and by motor activi-
ty. The child's conception of the world is realise d 
by the perceptions of his senses and by his increasing 
manipulation and discovery of the objects in his en-
vironment. The infant knowing nothing of his own self 
becomes a 2-year-old aware of a larger external world, 
a nd is already beginning to enjoy some control over 
his world. Piaget claims that in this period, child-
ren begin to develop some notion of object permanence. 
Infants know only themselves and believe that objects 
only exist if they are able to see them. Thus "out 
of sight, out of mind" is a reality in these early 
months. However, once object permanence is understood 
the child realises that things exist independentl y and 
permanently, in relation to himself; and this marks 
the beginning of understanding of the larger world . 
.•. fAlso 
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Also important to this stage is the beginning of a 
conception of causality; the idea that the ha nd can 
grasp the bottle and move it towards the mouth etc. 
Understanding this concept sets the stage for further 
cognitive development. 
1.4.2. THE PREOPE RATI ONAL STAGE (2 - 7 YEARS) 
In this stage the child develops ways of representing 
objects and events through symbols, including the 
verbal symbols of language. This then implies that 
the child can now think about things that are not 
immediately present to him (in his line of sight), and 
that he can now begin to solve certain types of prob-
lems - particularly those problems based upon v i s ual 
items. However, the child still continues to be 
e gocentric. The child already realises that the 
world does not revolve around him, but he is still 
incapable of stepping outside of himself a nd adopting 
another's point of view. 
I n this stage, classification is a difficult task -
as the child tends to reason by one dimensi on only . 
In Piaget's famous experiment, children see a bead as 
either brown or wooden, but not both at once. The 
.. . /child 
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child is simply unable to classify a single object as 
two things at once - he is unable to include the class 
of wooden beads in t he class of brown beads. 
Piaget also demonstrates that the preoperational child 
is unable to understand a notion of conservation. 
Conservation referring to the ability to recognise 
that the basic attributes of an object such as volume 
or weight remain the same even when the appearance of 
an object is transformed. According to Piaget these 
children are limi ted by centration - by centering on 
one dimension of an object to the exclusion of all 
others. Furthermore they do not understand 
reversibility ; the ability to see t r ansformations in 
clay for instance, and think back to seeing two lumps 
of equal size; this being a process of thought that 
would allow the realisation that the quantity remains 
the same whateve r the s h ape. 
In this period two substages are distinguished:-
Stage I (Pre- conceptual Intelligence 2 - 4 yrs): 
Here the stage of symbolic or pre - conceptual thought 
is reached with the appearance of language. The child 
is able to attach a symbol to an object but is unable 
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to construct - by abstractions and generalisations -
a concept of the object. In other words, the child 
cannot distinguish between the general and the particu-
lar, for his reasoning is transductive. 
Stage 2 (Intuitive Thought 4 - 7 yrs): 
In this stage the child appears to have an intuit ive 
grasp of physical and social properties and relation-
ships . However he is still unable to reason logically, 
as his reasoning still remains linked to his percep-
tions. 
1.4.3. THE CONCRETE OPERATIONAL STAGE (7 - 11 YRS) 
At the end of the preoperational stage, the child 
becomes more flexible in his reasoning, concentrating 
on more than one dimension at a time, and he begins to 
conserve. He begins to realise that because something 
appears to be bigger and longer it is not necessarily 
so. He cannot however, apply this knowledge to 
volume and weight until he is Older, but once he is 
able to understand that number remains constant and 
that mass does not shift, he has entered into concrete 
operations. Here the child can begin to think logic -
ally, although there still exist certain limitations . 
. . . /The 
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The primary limitation is that the child is just at 
the beginning of logical thought - a period where he 
can still onl y solve problems that are presented in 
concrete terms; if the problem is to be solved by 
thought alone, it becomes insoluable. 
Once the concrete operational stage is re ac hed, the 
child is no longer totally egocentric. It is in this 
stage that the child begins to communicate with others, 
compare other's points of view with their own, recheck 
their ideas and decide on what is right. This is, 
therefore, a stage of cooperation and competition 
with peers group members, for the social interactio n 
in which ideas are tested. 
1.4.4 THE FORMAL OPERATIONAL STAGE (11 - 15 YRS) 
In this period the child is generally past the age of 
relying on concrete objects. Here, he can think 
about abstractions and visualise logical solutions 
internally. He is able to apply a single theory to 
many problems or many theories to a single problem , 
whereas in concrete operations the child can 6nly 
attack one problem at a time. In this stage the 
child is able to organise information, re aso n 
... /scientifically, 
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scientifically, build up hypotheses through understand-
ing causality, and test these hy potheses , often with-
out manipulating concrete objects. 
However, although the adolescent has reached the 
potential of adult thought he still remains egocentric 
to an extent. He is able to be logical, but is not 
necessarily realistic as he generally appears to be 
absorbed in his new found powers of reason, and tends 
to look at the world in an idealistic way. As the 
ado l escent moves into adulthood, the quality of the 
thought st r ucture may not change, but more of a 
balance between assimilation and accommodation is 
achieved, and idealism becomes modified and ' softened' 
by reality. 
1.5 PIAGET - PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Piaget has not constructed a theory of teaching, but as 
he is concerned with cognitive development, he does 
hold some important implications for pedagogy. 
Phillips (1969) claims that Piaget's implications lie 
specifically in three principles; (1) construction 
through action, (2) transfer as sequential inte-
gration of structures, and (3) motivation through 
... /cognitive 
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cognitive conflict. 
1.5.1. CONSTRUCTION THROUGH ACTION 
To Piaget, knowledge is action - cognition develops 
from the interior is at ion of actions on the world, of 
operations. The mind is thus not a passive receptacle 
but an active organising, constructing system. 
Information from the environment cannot be assimilated 
unless there are already in existence the relative 
structures to absorb this information. Piaget points 
out that knowledge gained via logico - mathematical 
experience is invented, not merely accepted as is 
knowledge gained through social transmission. The 
implication for teaching here, is an emphasis on doing. 
The child must be allowed to actively discover his 
world and explore it in such a way that his activity 
will lead to the development of cognitive structures. 
1.5.2 TRANSFER AS SEQUENTIAL INTEGRATION OF STRUCTURES 
Structures are not 'given' but are constructed - in 
the formation of a structure of reasoning each new 
procedure depends on those the child has just acquired. 
Once achieved, this structure serves as a start i ng 
point for new acquisitions. Consequently no amount 
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of , training' will produce higher levels of thinking. 
It is at this point that the role of the teacher is 
questioned - fo r if Piaget is correct then an individual 
cannot be 'taught' anything, until he has developed the 
relative structures enabling assimilation. Thus , the 
te acher's role becomes not one of imparting knowledge 
to 'uneducated' children (which Piaget terms learning 
in the narrow sense, i.e . learning without understanding); 
but rather one of a fac i litator attempting to guide, 
encourage and fac ilit ate the child to interact with 
objects in order that he might receive direct feedback 
from them. For the t eacher to be a facilitator wou ld 
also require sensitive i nsight into the child's level 
of cognitive development. 
1.5.3. MOTIVATION THROUGH COGNITIVE CONFLICT 
Smedslund (1964) argues that logical necessity and 
internal contradiction a re of great importance in the 
determination of children 's intellectual and personal 
development. Changes in a child's thinking come about 
not by external reinforcement, but via his efforts to 
restore equilibrium, resolving a conflict between the 
information input from the environment and the cogni-
tive structure. Thus , motivation is intrinsic to the 
. .. /activity 
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activity itself. It follows therefore that, in order 
to encourage further cognitive development, the 
'teacher' (facilitator) attempts to guide the individual 
in such a way as to induce cognitive conflict by 
arranging for an optimal discrepancy between the environ-
mental inputs and the existing cognitive structures. 
Phillips (1969) points out that if the input is precise-
ly congruent with the existing structures, then accommo-
dation would not occur; conversely if the input does 
not fit the structure at all, then the input is not 
even partially assimilated. Optimal discrepancy, then, 
is that where the complexity of the cognitive structure 
almost, but not fully, matches the complexity of the 
input. In other words, the individual should have 
some understanding (but not total understanding) of 
the information facing him, and he will be self motivat-
ed to gain full understanding, simply by the necessity 
of realising equilibrium. If the information is 
totally above the individual's comprehension, he will 
not experience disequilibrium and will not be motivated 
towards getting to grips with the info r mation. 
1.6. ACCELERATION OF COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 
The idea of accelerating cognitive development has been 
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under much debate, with some theorists being in favour 
of acceleration and others aga inst. Acceleration, in 
this context, means the effort to move children from 
the cognitive stage appropriate for their age to a 
higher stage usually associated with an older age 
group. Most arguments for acceleration centre around 
t he i dea that children show an ea rly 'natural' 
intellectual curiosity, and this should be encouraged 
rather than stifled. Arguments against acceleration 
programmes centre around the idea that although one 
can accelerate development, conceptual understanding 
does not necessarily follow, for it is very much an 
individual experience, and furthermore the emotional 
development of the young person must be taken into 
account as any accele r a tion p ressure may cause anxiety. 
Piaget's position is that cognitive development, by 
necessity, much sequentially follow the stage that he 
has outlined, but he does see acceleration as possible, 
provided that the structure one wishes to 'facilitate' 
t o the subject can be supported by simpler , more 
elementary logico-mathema tical structures. In this 
regard Piaget asks us to imagine an analagous structure, 
but in a simpler , more elementary situation . 
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Piaget, when questioned as to whether or not the 
developmental stages in children's thinking could be 
accelerated by practise, training and exercises in 
perception in memory, pointed out that there are two 
very different aspects of cognition which must be 
distinguished; 
aspect. 
the figurative aspect and the operative 
"The figurative aspect deals with static 
configurations. In physical reality there 
are states, and in addition to these there 
are transformations which lead from one state 
to another. In cognitive functioning one has 
the figurative aspect - for example, perception, 
imitation, mental imagery etc. 
The operative aspect includes operations and 
the actions which lead from one state to 
another. In children of the higher stages 
and in adults, the figurative aspects are 
subordinated to the operative aspects. 
Any given state is understood to be the 
result of some transformation and the 
point of departure for another transformation." 
(Piaget, 1964, p.186). 
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Thus, according to Piaget, exercising perception and 
memory is 'reinforcing' the figurative aspect without 
influencing the operative aspect, and this will no t 
accelerate the development of cognitive structures. 
"Wha t needs to be reinforced is the 
operative aspect - not the analysis of 
states, but the understanding of trans-
formations". 
(Piaget, 1964, p. 186) 
CHAPTER TWO 
JAMES RUSSELL'S MODIFICATIONS OF PIAGETIAN THEORY 
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2. RUSSELL'S MODIFICATIONS OF PIAGET 
James Russell (1978), whose book "The Acquisition of 
Knowledge" has stimulated many of the ideas of this 
research, offe rs constructive criticisms of Piaget's 
genetic epistemology. He compares Baldwin's genetic 
epistemology to that of Piaget a nd concludes by offer-
ing a theory of cognitive development that attempts to 
overcome certain limitations existing in Piaget's 
framework. 
2 .1 THE ROLE OF SOCIETY & THE CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM 
Russell accuses Piaget of attempting to absorb the 
epistemological into the genetic via his thoroughgoing 
structuralism, which consequently (in common with 
empiricists and rationalists) leads Piaget to the 
implicit assumption that the child acquir es knowledge 
totally by his own efforts without any aid from others. 
Piaget views social inter action as another for m of 
operational activity and that every process, including 
the social, is a further manifestation of the universal 
tendency towards equilibrium. 
"Piaget regards society on the model o f 
the organism, so it is not possible within 
... /Piagetian 
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Piagetian theory to talk of the cultural 
transmission of knowledge because this 
process is itself the working out of an 
equilibration whose principles transcend 
and underly social phenomena; 'education I 
is taken to affect only the ease with 
which operativity is attained." 
(Russell, 1978, p.209). 
Baldwin's approach on the other hand offers an account 
of the conceptual system within which the child is 
developing, catering for the dialectic between the 
child and concrete reality and a lso the child and the 
human community. In contrast to Piaget, Baldwin sees 
the child developing into a ready made (but still 
evolving) conceptual system. 
Thus Baldwin bases his theory on the view that know-
ledge is essentially 'public property' (a similar view 
to Wittgenstein). Baldwin claims that the child's 
awareness of himself must be well established before 
he is able to appreciate any symbolic meaning, and that 
it is through language that the child achieves a common 
syndoxic meaning enabling him to join the cognitive 
community. This consciousness of self and others 
. .. /develops 
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develops from social roots (via the important process 
of imitation) rather than via the cognitive structures 
being established with the concrete world privately, as 
Piaget believes. 
Essential to Piaget's argument is the view that all 
individuals tread t he same logica l path, this being 
because equilibrium provides a unique but necessary 
outcome with each stage being the most probable out-
come after the previous stage has been equilibrated. 
By necessity then, all individuals develop identical 
rules of logic by virtue of their physical interaction 
with the real world. In the context of Baldwin, 
Russell takes issue with Piaget's not ion of structures 
being uniquely inevit able and scientific, pointing out 
that the individual is born into the logic of society 
- a logic brought about by functional demands. 
Baldwin emphasises that a sharing of experiences is a 
necessary prior condition of objective knowledge. 
Before the child can think for himself he has to ex -
perience with others. This e ntails the assumptio n 
that cognitive development is dependent on the caretaker 
providing the child with a necessary set of experiences 
- hence Baldwin's characterization of cognitive 
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development as the child's initiation into the concep-
tual system. The caretaker can be seen as the 'mediator' 
between society and the infant. Russell points out that 
in Trevarthen's (1974) observations (where the infant 
inter alia becomes active, mother vocalises, infant 
smiles and vocalises) the inf ant is very basically 
responding to social signs with other signs, creating 
and maintaining social interaction. Trevarthen refers 
to this phenomena as 'primary intersubjectivity' and 
closely allied to this is the question of imitation. 
Russell claims, in support of the Baldwinian dialectic 
of personal growt h, that the infant has an innate ability 
to share the experiences of others via the process of 
imitation - prior to the child having any knowledge 
of the concrete world as separate from himself, he has 
an awareness of other people being imitable. Imi tation 
is primary, independent of any prior cogni tive elabora-
tions, and it is through this process of imitation that 
the child becomes aware of himself and others as con-
scious agents; furthermore, it enables a distinction 
to be made between one's own actions and the actions 
of others. It is with the onset of imitation that the 
infant begins to develop a sense of autonomy, realising 
that his experiences can be shared with others. Thus 
... /the 
- 34 -
the child begins to develop some primitive knowledge 
of the minds of others, whilst a t the same time he is 
beginning to actively explore his physical world; 
acquiring a knowledge of the regularities in the con-
crete world. 
Russell claims that the child brings these two kinds 
of knowledge to the process of language acquisition. 
Furthermore, achieving competence in the use of the 
categories and structures of the language system has 
a dual effect on the child's cognitive development. 
The child's cognitions become structured by the cate-
gories and structures of language and secondly, the child 
develops towards a public mode of consciousness. 
"At the outset, this public consciousness 
is relatively unstructured by the conventions 
of the conceptual system. The child is, 
however, aware of the shared nature of con-
ceptual knowledge, and thus has some notion 
of the criteria for true judgements, corres-
ponding roughly to Baldwin's syndox ic common-
ness...... When the c hild does acquire 
knowledge, n o t so much o f what the rules are 
but of their objective 'transpersonal' n a ture, 
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- 35 -
we have the kind of understanding 
which Baldwin seemed to be intending by 
synnomic judgement. Eventually he is 
able to reflect on the system itself and 
evo l ve a consciousness of what he has been 
doing all along - 'inference' in Baldwin's 
terminology." 
(Russell, 1978, p.229) 
Russell warns against viewing this imitation from a 
'social determinist' framework as this ascribes a 
certain passive nature to the child - it should rather 
be seen as a process of initiation into the conceptual 
system where the child is actively participating as 
opposed to merely copying the system's characteristics. 
The child is actively involved in dynamic interaction 
with other s in the community. 
Piaget does not overl ook the importance of social 
interaction entirely, seeing it as a 'motivating fo rce' 
that moves the child towards overcoming his egocentrism 
- the interaction with peers provides the ch i ld with 
alternative, conflicting perspectives. Thus to Piaget, 
knowledge develops not from othe rs directly, but from 
the efforts of the child to rec oncile these c onflicting 
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perspectives with his own towards the eventual re al isa-
tion of the 'epistemic', o r objec ti ve self. 
Considering the role of society in cognitive deve lopment 
necessarily leads towards a notion of cultural variabi-
lity in the way a child comes to grasp concrete truths. 
The Baldwinian approach (in contrast to Pi aget) would 
appear to be more adequate here, suggesting that t here 
ar e various possible routes that can be taken in the 
developmental process from the sensorimotor stage to 
the preoperational stage for instance; that the actual 
route taken is the conceptual system that the child 
is being cognitively initiated into. 
It follows then that where in cross-cultural research, 
fo r example, the individuals of a specific culture 
are found to be predominantly preoperational in their 
conceptual development, this is no reflection of the 
cognitive potential of the individuals, but rather a n 
expression of the functional demands on the conceptual 
systems. Any further distance travelled in conceptual 
development is irrelevant to the lives of the individuals 
within the culture. 
Th is consideration i n no way refutes the validi ty of 
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Piaget's theory or his outline of the developmental 
stages, but if anything broadens it. However what 
must be realised is that Piaget's theory of cognitive 
development is essentially an account of the development 
of scientific knowledge, and the way in which scientific 
laws of the real world are understood. Because there 
may be subtle alternative routes that a child may 
follow in the development from sensorimotor actions 
to the preoperational stage for instance, in no way 
implies that the child may move from the sensorimotor 
stage directly to concrete operations. Piaget's sequence 
of the developmental stages still holds true. 
De Lemos (1969) has demonstrated this precisely in a 
study of the development of conservation in Aboriginal 
children. It was found that the three stages of develop-
ment described by Piaget could clearly be distinguished, 
and the explanations and responses given by the children 
revealed the same processes of development that Piaget 
outlines for European (Genevan) children. However, 
whilst the general results supported Piaget's stages 
of development, the invariant order of development for 
the conservation of quantity and weight as postulated 
by Piaget was not supported. De Lemos found that 
more children succeeded on the test of weight rather 
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than that of quantity. Furthermore, contrary to 
Piaget's postulation, the conservation of area was not 
achieved at the same age as the conservation of quantity 
and length, but was a much later achievement. 
Dasen (1975) compared concrete operational development 
across three cultures. In the light of a model of 
ecological functionalism the hypothesis that nomadic, 
hunting, subsistence-economy populations would develop 
spatial concepts more rapidly than would sedentary, 
agriculturalists groups was supported. This finding 
is of significance to Piaget's theory in that it demon-
strates that the rates of development are not uniform 
across cultures. In other words the "structure 
d'ensenmble" that Piaget posits fo r the Genevan child 
does not always hold in different cultures. Dasen 
cor rectly points out that what has become apparent from 
this type of cross-cultural research is that it is not 
possible to look at the processes that organise think-
ing wi thin a culture, without taking cogniscence of 
the value that the culture places on various concepts. 
Where then, one may ask, does Piaget's observations of 
Genevan children prove to be of major sign ificance? 
It is the author's opinion that the outline of the 
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conceptual development of Genevan children can be seen 
as an 'ideal type' (in the Weberian sense), to be used 
as a form of measuring stick, against which the re-
searcher can attempt to analyse the development of 
scientific thought in other cultures. With the 
emphasis on Genevan children being 'ideal', the fact 
that they may be more 'advanced' than individuals of 
another culture does not necessarily imply that they 
are 'better'. As Dasen (1977) points out, one should 
rather look at cultures in terms of being different, 
than as being deficient which implies that individuals 
of various cultures are different but equal, insofar 
as there exists the potential towards conceptual 
development. Furthermore, a value system need not be 
associated with a stage theory. 
"Indeed, the differences we do find beyond 
the basic universals are the reflection of 
a truly valuable cultural plurality." 
(Dasen, 1977, p.12) 
Considering social influences brings into focus the 
debates concerning the effects of differing child-
rearing practises, both cross-culturally and within 
cultures, on conceptual devel opment. Chiv Lian -Hwang 
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(1972) provides evidence demonstrating the individual 
differences in cognitive style are closely related to 
different family experiences. Bing (1963) shows more 
directly that discrepant verbal ability is fostered by 
a close relationship with a somewhat intrusive mother, 
whilst discrepant non-verbal abilities are enhanced 
by allowing the child a considerable degree of freedom 
to experiment on his own. 
However, the striking contrasts in conceptual develop-
ment cannot be accounted for by differences in child-
re aring practises and differences in the conceptual 
systems alone, but also needs consideration of what 
Russell terms 'functional interests'. 
2.2. A VIEW OF NECESSITY 
Within the context of the influence of the conceptual 
system, Russell objects to the way in which Piaget's 
cognitive structural ism attributes an 'asocial' nece-
ssity to mental structures. Piaget claims that equili-
brium (autoregulation) is a necessity, and furthermore 
that the development of thought follows, by necessity, 
one single path. 
"Perhaps the most fundamental point of 
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divergence between the Piagetian and 
the present account is that we ar e 
concerned with the fact that conceptual 
intelligence relies o n the acquisition 
of the criteria for the truth of judgements, 
and these criteria are, of necessity, socially 
constructed. A mental structure may be 
equilibrated or otherwise but it cannot be 
true or false." 
(Russell, 1978, p.238) 
Russell supports the Wittgensteinian notion that know-
ledge is a system of consensual judgements; furthermore 
public agreement is only made possible by the use of 
language, and by putting language to use in the world 
a system of necessity is evolved. 
"We have had to 'impose' the particular 
system of verbal concepts on ourselves 
in order that we might communicate and 
have any social existence at all." 
(Russell, 1978, p.241) 
Thus to Russell, necessity lies i n the net work o f rule-
bound conc epts that enable us to communicate about 
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various abstractions from the concrete reality; it is 
the system of rule-bound concepts that necessitates 
the structuring of thought. More specifically, it 
would appear that Russell's criticism of necessity is 
only directed towards Piaget's assumption that each 
progressive stage realised in cognitive development, 
via convergent reconstruction, is nec essarily inevitable. 
In other words, logico-mathematical thought, for inst ance, 
is the inevitable and necessary outcome of the equili-
bration and convergent reconstruction of concrete 
operations. To Russell, logico-mathematical thought 
necessarily arises out of our system of rule-bound 
concepts that enable communication, and also from our 
need to communicate. 
Russell's criticism, however, does not appear to 
challenge Piaget's assumption that equilibrium is a 
cognitive necessity - that equilibrium must be reached 
before there can be any further development in mental 
structures. 
2 . 3 • TOWARDS CONSCIOUSNESS 
Russell also objects to the way in which Piaget's 
cognitive structuralism regards consciousness. Russell 
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claims that cognitive structuralism disposes of 
knowledge as something ineluctably conscious by supple-
menting it with non-consious structures. 
"Thus Piaget denies the relevance of 
consciousness because 'operational 
behaviour' makes it redundant; and 
a lthough he claims that the child reflects 
o n structures as he gets towards the formal 
stage his view is clearly that mental 
mach inery determines the acquisition of 
knowledge:" 
(Russell, 1978, p.243) 
Rotman (1977) points this out more clearly by asking 
how does a subject know which encounters with his 
environment are disequilibrating? In Piaget's frame-
work, the subject cannot know experientially, neither 
can he decide by making a rational judgement, for 
equil ibration is the very source of rationality and 
intelligence. Piaget cannot invo ke an external agency 
to mediate the working of the equilibrium principle as 
it is equil ibrium itself which performs this function. 
"Piaget's solution to the problem is a 
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radical one. He eliminates the subject's 
role entirely, replacing him by the automatic 
working of his cognitive system, and concludes 
that a subject neither knows nor judges an 
encounter with the world to be disequili-
brating. His cognitive system simply 
experiences, and responds appropriately to, 
disequilibria much as a gyroscope might to 
being tilted or,to be more appropriately 
physiological, the statocyst in our ear 
does when we move from the vertical." 
(Rotman, 1977, p.100) 
Thus, on the one hand, Piaget is proposing a purely 
mechanical nature of equilibrium and self-regulation -
thus removing from psychological investigation all the 
difficulties associated with a conscious purposive 
agent and on the other hand, Piaget perceives each 
process of growth - the physical growth from embryo to 
child, cognitive growth from child to adult and 
epistemic subject - as governed by increasing equilibrium. 
Thus it would appear that Piaget's 'tertium quid' is 
collapsing into an inatist or preformatist account even 
if each developmental stage becomes the most probable 
after the occurence of the preceding one . 
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- 45 -
Russell claims that it is only by making reference to 
consciousness, that the acquisition of knowledge can 
be made intelligible . Furthermore, the rejection of 
consciousness in behaviourism, cognitive structuralism 
and many other ranges of scientific psychology springs 
from a philosophical naivete on the part of psychologists. 
Following Wittgenstein's line of thought, it can be 
argued that if an individual is to be considered as 
being able to make cognitive judgements, then conscious -
ness becomes a necessary condition. In addition, in 
any judgemental process there has to exist a public 
criterion against which the judgement can be made. 
As public criteria-bound evidence is a necessity, it 
can be said that agreement about objective criteria 
is ingrained wt thin the conceptual system. Para-
doxically, Wittgenstein argues that consciousness is 
not a private enterprise but a public possession, 
rooted in the conceptual system. 
Russell ther e fore claims that knowledge is not merely 
something that happens to the child (via a mechanical 
process of equilibrium); rather there is a necessary 
and determining conscious element. Knowledge can 
only be made public and objective by the use of 
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language. a symbolic system. and the child is only able 
to make his world objective to himself by using the 
rules of this linguistic-conceptual system. The 
development and realisation of knowledge is thus necess-
arily a function o f consciousness or awareness. 
·, ..... consciousness comes in by virtue of 
the fact that the child 'knows he knows' 
indeed knows how he knows and can thus 
say in principle - if not a lways in 
practise - why he is judging the way 
he is; a nd thus we re-encounter Kant 's 
principle of reflexive self-awareness. 
and the justification of judgements as 
truths by objective criteria." 
(Russell. 1978. p.250) 
Following from the argumen t of consciousness. Russell 
introduces a noti o n of intentionality - as knowledge 
does not merely happen to an individual. the evolving 
ability to make judgements must be seen as involving 
the purposive utilization of what the subject already 
knows. in order that he may accommodate that which he 
does not know. Furthermore. there must exist some 
conscious intention towards becoming aware of public 
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criteria against which judgements are made. Russell 
points out that because there is intentional purposive 
action, does not imply that the subject is conscious 
of what is happening to his mental processes. 
"So although the mental processes are not 
always conscious, the act of thinking is 
necessarily conscious in the sense that what 
we think is a function of what we intend, 
which is a function of what we want - and 
hence the interrelationship of conscious-
ness, knowledge and functional interests 
" 
(Russell, 1978, p.253) 
2.3.1. A COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS 
Being confronted with the notion that mental processes 
are not always conscious, Russell finds it useful to 
propose the existence of a 'Cognitive Unconscious' 
similar to the Freudian notion of the unconscious. 
Russell points out that Piaget's structuralism po i nts 
towards non-conscious thought structures; because of 
their formal complexity, they never become conscious 
and never need to become conscious. Freud, on the 
other hand, did not regard unconscious mental processes 
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in this way. In Freud's model, unconscious material can 
become conscious under certain conditions by virtue of 
the fact that unconscious material is initially conscious. 
Russell proposes that a cognitive unconscious develops 
as a direct result of the growth of conscious mental 
processes; that all thinking carried out unconsciously 
can in principle be realised consciously. 
"At the outset the child's consciousness 
consists of sensory data, and what will 
later be the unconscious and conscious 
elements of thinking are fused. But 
as thinking becomes more determined by 
things and more structured by abstract 
features of the conceptual system (for 
example, grammar, logic), as one element 
of thinking becomes more public, in 
Baldwin's sense, and thus conscious, 
there is a corresponding, inverse 
development towards a purely private, 
unmediated kind of thinking which splits 
away from the determination by the data 
and forms moulding what is essentially 
public in consciousness. 
. .. I ... consciousness 
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... consciousness is, in one sense, a 
public phenomenon, the cognitive un-
conscious is private insofar as it 
lacks everything that thought requires 
to be knowledge - especially it lacks 
any sensory content, linguistic expression, 
all that Baldwin meant by systems of 
'control' and the reflexive self-conscious-
ness which must accompany this." 
(Russell, 1978, p.254) 
Russell speculates that the cognitive unconscious 
functions in a seemingly automatic, ballistic and 
autonomous manner in relation to conscious thought, 
because it lacks the reflective self-consciousness that 
is associated with objective knowledge. Russell 
claims that conscious thought engages the unconscious 
by setting it problems; the cognitive unconscious 
has the ability to solve problems and provide creative 
insights because it is free to make unusual associations 
and groupings of data that would not be possible in 
conscious thought, as it is not tied down by a rule 
bound context. The data of the cognitive unconscious 
is able to be processed only because it was initially 
conscious. Furthermore, the way in which the data is 
... / organised 
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organised is dependent upon how it is originally 
consciously experienced. Russell shows that the 
relationship between the cognitive unconscious and 
the conscious mind is dialectical as the conscious 
mind engages the unconscious processes and the uncon-
scious processes influence what will be consciously 
judged. 
Introducing the concept of the cognitive unconscious 
is heuristically valuable, in that it enables considera-
tion to be given to a dialectic between the affective 
life and cognition; biological invariants and cognition, 
whilst at the same time catering for Piaget's assumption 
that the structures or transformations forming the 
foundations of cognition can never be made conscious. 
Although the structures are manufactured out of 
conscious operations upon the real world, all that the 
subject is cognitively conscious of at any point in 
time is the content of the structures - the raw data 
and the physical manifestations of these cognitive 
structures, which Piaget describes as schemes. 
Considering individual consciousness and conceptual 
development as being rooted in the conceptual system, 
however, smacks of soci a l determinism, leading towards 
... / a 
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a destruction of the argument that the child is active 
as opposed to passive in the process of cognitive 
development, unless consideration is given to what 
Russell terms 'functional interests.' 
2.4 . FUNCTIONAL I NTERESTS 
Functional interests can be seen as being what the 
child wants to do and takes pleasure in doing from one 
instance to another. 
"Of course these functional interests 
develop: from the infant shaking his 
rattle; the toddler building a tower 
of bricks; the adolescent taking a 
radio apart to see how it works. When 
these are given free rein or when they 
appear to serve no practical or educa-
tional end the adult calls these 'play' 
(Russell, 1978, p.240) 
" 
It is this concept of functional inter e sts that brings 
a certain voluntarism into Russell's account of concep-
tual development. It gives the child a freedom to 
'discover' and explore areas of the world that he is 
interested in, and consequently allows for an explana-
... / tion 
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tion of individual differences existing in cognitive 
development both cross-culturally and within anyone 
culture. However, this freedom is not to be seen as 
absolute, for functional interests also find their 
roots within the conceptual system. Russell thus 
proposes a dialectical interrelationship wh ich exists 
between the conceptual system, consciousness and 
functional interests (diagramatically illustrated below). 
CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM 
/~ 
< ~ 
FUNCTIONAL INTERESTS CONSCIOUSNESS 
Moving in a clockwise direction, the conceptual system 
determines the child's consciousness (particularly 
via the vehicle of language); the level of conscious 
knowledge then determines the kinds of functional 
interests that the child will entertain. The function-
al interests then influence the way in which the child 
will put the conceptual system to use. Functiona l 
interests also influence the way in which the concep t ua l 
system is manifested to the child. The process may 
also function in the reverse in that the child's level 
of consciousness determines the degree to which he is 
... /capable 
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capable of construing the conceptual system as it is 
manifested t o him by others. The structure of the 
conceptual system will determine how the manifestation 
of the child's functional interests will be entertained 
by others, and finally the functional interests determine 
the things that the child wishes to be conscious of at 
any particular time. 
"Indeed, another way of conceiving functional 
interests is as that which determines the 
forms of life the child expresses and wishes 
to pursue at any particular stage in his 
development, or second in time. Needless 
to say, there is a phylogenetic component 
in these interests which diminishes through-
out the course of the acquisition of know-
ledge." 
(Russell, 1978, p.245) 
Russell does not deny that human thought is structured, 
but prefers to see the rules of thought (being isomorphic 
to Piaget's structures of concrete operations) as 
existing outside the individual and within the conceptual 
system. These rules of thought evolved within the 
. .. /culture 
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culture in response to expedite functional demands; 
the system is moulded out of a practical necessity. 
Thus according to Russell, in cognitive development, 
the child is initiated into this system via the 
'bridge' of rule-bound concepts through the intersub-
jective experiences of everyday social interaction -
the child is continually building onto his stock of 
cognitive concepts within the framework of a se t of 
functional interests. As mentioned previously, the 
infant has the ability to enjoy intersubjective ex -
periences with the caretaker, and it is t hrough this 
intersubjectivity that the caretaker guides the infant 
initially, towards the rule-bound concepts, a nd hence 
towards the development of cognitive structures and 
consequently, functional interests. Thus the child 
co-ordinates his rule-bound concepts by the continuous 
process of restructuring concepts out of lower elements 
into a system which is already there. Thinking, 
eventually, becomes more autonomous as it becomes 
progressively independent of its functional origins. 
To be considered alongside with functional interests, 
is the role of motivation in cognitive development. 
2 .5. MOTIVATION 
... /According 
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According to Piaget, it is the principle of equilibra-
tion that energises cognitive growth since biological 
invariants of survival and adaptation create a need 
for the subject to achieve equilibrium, thus necessarily 
providing the motivation towards cognitive growth so 
that achieving equilibrium is a logical necessity. 
Russell points out that the equilibrium principle 
points to the fact that for any cognitive changes to 
occur , there must initially exist a certain conf lict 
or inconsistency in the mind of the subject - the 
subject must be able to recognise the inconsistency 
that exists before he can move towards achieving equili -
brium. However, Russell asks why the recognition of 
an inconsistency on the part of the subject should 
necessarily motivate cognitive change, unless the 
subject himself actually wants to overcome the inc on-
sistency? In other words, Russell is allow i ng con-
sider at ion for certain inconsistencies that the indivi-
dual might accept without necessarily moving towards 
equilibration (a similar notion is to be found in 
Ri egel's theory of dialectical operations.) 
To Russell , the explanation as to why in certain 
instances a subject may be content to agree or disagree 
with others holding different judgements is to be found 
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in the nature of the conceptual system. 
"On the present perspective, the fact that 
some kinds of judgement have to attain 
consistency, but not others, is in the 
nature of the system of concrete know-
ledge which is being transmitted to the 
child; and thus the attainment of con-
sistency between truth values of such 
transformational and multi-relational 
judgements is a form of life to which 
the child has to adapt ... equilibrium 
is a principle which reflects the 
norms of our thinking, which in turn, 
we might add, reflect forms of life 
rather than biological necessities 
of autoregulation. The motivational 
aspect of this is what might be called 
the 'cultural education' of the child's 
interests in the direction of certain 
kinds of consistency." 
(Russell, 1978, p.265) 
In order for the child to be able to recognise any 
inconsistency or conflict, he must be aware of how the 
.•. /conceptual 
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conceptual system construes the relevant rUle-bound 
concept - the child must be exposed to certain standards 
of consistency and, furthermore, his functional interests 
must be such that the child wants to achieve consistency 
in the relevant rule-bound concept. Russell thus claims 
that the social life of the subject initially creates 
and then directs his interests towards achieving various 
standards of consistency, viewing Piaget ' s assimilation-
ac commodation model as reduridant, and replacing it with 
an interest-accommodation model. 
Russell claims that Piaget's Assimilation Principle can 
be viewed as a motivational principle - what is assimi-
lated is what the subject wants to do and what he is 
interested in doing. Where the subject wants to do 
something but fails in doing it points toward a failure 
in the subject's accommodatory capacity. The subject's 
interests are not matched to his accommodatory capacity, 
to what his cognitive structures can handle. In s upport 
of Baldwin, Russell views the human infant as enjoying 
an 'accommodatory plasticity', and, dependent on wha t 
the infant wants to do, determines the direction his 
accommoda tory capacity will take. Thus Russell's 
interest-accommodation model appe a rs to include, 
transcend and thus broaden Pi aget 's assi milation -
... /accommodation 
- 58 -
accommodation model. 
"Thus we have an interest-accommodation 
model and a dialectic similar to that of 
Baldwin in which cognitive growth is 
generated by schematic, semblant, experi-
mental, imitative, selective interests, 
the conceptual heirs of which are the 
functional aspect of language use, 
judgemental proposition, abstraction, 
intension, accretion of meanings and 
synthesis. The dialectical nature of 
the system ensures that the motivational 
aspect evolves with every accommodatory 
success so there is a mutual determination 
between what the child wants and what he 
can do or understand." 
(Russell, 1978, p.267) 
As the child at the end of the sensorimotor stage 
becomes aware of the self-world dicotomy, he may have 
developed a reflexive awareness of his own interests 
and is able to differentiate between wanting a thing 
and the act of attaining it - a realisation that the 
action is not an inevitable consequence of the action . 
... /Thus, 
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Thus, Russell claims that behaviour has a certain 
autonomy over interests an idea which is fundamental 
to any consideration of moral development in the child. 
There exists an intimate relationship between motivation 
and moral judgement, and it is Baldwin who proposes 
that moral development and ideas of value and worth 
originate in the earliest selective interests of the 
infant (guided via the intersubjective experience of 
the caretaker.) 
Consequently, Russell points out that with the autonomy 
of behaviour over interests, the freedom exists for a 
subject simultaneously to follow his interests whilst 
being able to condemn them morally. 
CHAPTER THREE 
RUSSELL'S IMPLICATIONS TO CROSS-CULTURAL RESEARCH AND 
THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
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3.1 CROSS-CULTURAL PIAGETIAN RESEARCH: 
Russell's propositions do not invalidate Piaget's 
theory of cognitive development as there is no denial 
that cognitive development takes place in a manner as 
outlined by Piaget. What Russell does attempt, if 
anything, is to take a closer, analytical view of 
various problematical areas within the Piagetian 
framework and to offer a deeper, more adequate explana-
tion of those areas that appear to have been 'glossed' 
over. He also provides a modified and extended theory 
that can help lead to a fuller, more exhaustive ex-
planation of cognitive development. The heart of 
this research lies at the cross-cultural interface, 
and it would appear that a consideration of Russell's 
propositions allows for a better interpretation of 
cross-cultural research findings and, more importantly, 
a deeper insight into the cross-cultural interface 
than the 'unmodified' Piagetian framework would permit. 
Dasen (1977) points out that one of the major critisms 
of Piaget's theory of development in cross-cultural 
research is that his notion of development is really 
the development of a Western scientist. There would 
appear to be a certain ethnocentric bias in Piaget; 
furthermore the demonstration that all individuals 
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reason according to a certain structure does not 
necessarily maintain that this is their preferred mode 
of reasoning. Berry (1974) for example, points out 
that we might not be adequately sampling the culturally 
relevant skills Piagetian theory may be asking : "how 
well can they do our tricks?", whereas what should 
be asked is "how well can they do their tricks?". In 
this light 'primitive' thought may not be primitive at 
all, but sophisticated. What this points to, is that 
a possibility exists that the reason this mode of 
thought (in , non-industrialised societies) has been 
labelled inferior is because we are unable to under-
stand it. 
There are many instances where evidence of a sophisti-
cated non-Western type of thinking have been found in 
cultures, much of which cannot be understood by the 
Western scientist. For instance, the logic of 
acupuncture, or the sophisticated navigatory techniques 
of Trukese islanders as portrayed by Thomas Gladwin 
(1973) - a method of accurate navigation totally alien 
from western methods . The point made here is that 
these other areas, where a 'different' kind of thinking 
is requir ed, may in fact be the kind of thinking that 
is most valued in a particular culture . 
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However, Dasen (1977) still finds enough evidence to 
support Piaget's universalistic hypotheses in cross-
cultural research, which demonstrates that in all 
cultures there is the existence and potential for the 
scientific thought that Piaget characterises. 
"r maintain this universalistic hypothesis 
in spite of recent suggestions of an ethno-
centric bias in Piaget's theory. On the 
other hand, I willingly concede that there 
are alternative cognitive structures that 
may be more adaptive to a given environment 
and more culturally valued." 
(Dasen, 1977, p.10) 
This appears to lend credibility to Russell's considera-
tions of the conceptual system of a society, and the 
functional demands upon that system being reflected 
respectively in the cognitive structures and functional 
interests of the individuals of a particular culture. 
However, although cultural differences are found in the 
way basic cognitive processes combine into functional 
cognitive systems, it appears that cross-cultural 
research has revealed that we are unlikely to find 
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cultural differences in the basic components of 
cognitive processes. That is, in support of Piaget, 
individuals of all cultures are engaged in the develop-
ment of cognition through their actions on the real 
world - these actions are attached to a real physical 
world having a certain structure, and must therefore 
lead to experiences which are culturally universal in 
their basic form. 
Opper (1977), in a study with Thai urban and rural 
children, demonstrates that intellectual development 
does not depend upon a specific type of object with 
which the individual must interact. Rather, what is 
required is an environment containing a variety of 
objects, with which the internal processes can interact. 
Furthermore, environments with a variety of objects are 
generally a universal feature which points toward the 
apparent universality of certain types of cognitive 
operations. Opper demonstrates that although the 
objects in the environments of rural and urban Thai 
children are different - with respect to mass media, 
toys, home ammenities, transport and so forth - there 
is nevertheless a similarity in the processes of c og-
nitive development because of the diversity of objects 
that exist in the environments of the two groups (To 
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be noted also is that both groups of Thai children 
share the same conceptual system). 
Dasen (1977) points out that the qualitative aspects 
of Piaget's theory (i.e. the sequence of stages, the 
structural properties and the types of explanations 
given by children) have been verified by the majority 
of cross-cultural research. Furthermore, the horizon-
tal decalages (i.e. the sequential conservations of 
quantity, weight, VOlume,) have been verified to a 
significant extent, on the average, within a population 
but has not been verified within each individual. 
Finally, considerable cultural variation has been 
found in the quantitative aspects of Piaget's theory 
(i.e. the rate of development through the stages). 
It is to be noted that Russell does not wish to over-
state the case of the influence of the conceptual 
system in cognitive development. From research 
findings it can be accepted that Piaget's universality 
hinges upon the interaction with a diverse environment 
and not specific objects as Opper points out - it is 
the transformations that are particularly important 
and not the objects themselves. However, Russell's 
notion of the conceptual 'system must be seen as 
'colouring' cognitive development differently from 
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culture to culture. 
Not only does cross-cultural research lend credibility 
to Russell's proposals of the role of the c onceptual 
system, but also to his notions of functional interests 
and their dialectical origin from the functional demands 
on the conceptual system. 
"The most influential type of experience 
(in the development of mass, weight and 
volume amongst Kamba children) may be 
found among those activities within a 
culture that are useful and vital for 
survival. " 
(Kiminyo, 1977, p.65) 
Obviously these functional demands vary from culture 
to culture, and Laurendeau-Bendavid (1977) points out 
that the variations or decalage in conceptual develop-
ment, found cross-culturally, usually exist in a pre-
dictable direction - the greater the extent of educa-
tion, industrialization or urbanisation in a culture, 
the faster is the rate of conceptual development. 
For example, Laurendeau-Bendavid, in a study of 
Canadian and Rwanda children, with respect to cultural 
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and educational variations states: 
"In sum, school attendance appears to be 
a facilitating r a ther than a necessary 
condition for the attainment of concrete 
operations and objective causal represen-
tations, since some of the children with-
out any schooling do attain these. On 
the other hand school attendance is a 
necessary but not suff icient condition 
for the attainment of formal operations, 
since only subjects with full school 
experience, - and on ly a few of these -
were found to have reached this level", 
(Laurendeau-Bendavid, 1977, p.165) 
and H W Page, in a study of Zulu youths states: 
"Fo r rur al youths, simply getting older did 
not guarantee the acquisition of more 
sophisticated co ncepts of space. Attend-
ing school , however, did provide an advantage, 
although this was not proportional to the 
amount of schooling." 
(Page, 1973, p.1S) 
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In yet another study, Lepper (1967) concludes that the 
development of Piagetian conservation concepts reflects 
differences in cultural backgrounds rather than in race. 
"This study showed that there were differ-
ences in the development of the science-
related concepts in negro and white first-
graders. These differences, according to 
the interpreta tion presented in this study, 
can be accounted for by differences in the 
subjects' backgrounds. This study did not 
reflect any innate differences in the subjects." 
(Lepper, 1967, p. 337) 
Much of Piagetian cross-cultural research, like those 
mentioned, points toward the significant influences of 
cultural backgrounds, educational transmission and en-
vironmental demands, in attempting to explain the ob-
served cross-cultural decalages existing in conceptual 
development. These findings support the credibility 
of Russell's model, although Russell goes even deeper 
than the conceptual system and functional demands in his 
notion of functional interests and motivation. Thus, 
not only are Russell's theoretical propositions of con-
siderable utility to any form of Piagetian analysis, 
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they also are extremely functional in that applying 
Russell to the findings of Piagetian cross-cultural 
research results in a more exhaustive and adequate 
interpretation. 
Piagetian theory revolves around four major factors 
as being responsible for cognitive growth. These are: 
a) Biological factors - these are linked 
to the 'epigenetic system' and offer an 
account of the interactions that exist 
between the genotype and the physical 
environment during the growth . 
b) Equilibration factors - this offers an 
account of development as a function of 
multiple activities; of actions upon the 
environment. Actions are co-ordinated 
into organised systems, which are depen-
dent upon the environment as well as on 
epigenetic potentialities . Intelligence 
is seen as being the highest level of 
systematic organisation in the march 
towards adaptation and autoregulation . 
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c) Social factors and interpersonal co-ordination -
this offers an account of the constant 
and valuable interpersonal exchange that 
occurs throughout the developmental pro-
cess, pointing towards the social life of 
the subject amongst peers and elders, to-
wards the realisation of objective judge-
ment and the 'epistemic' self. 
d) Educa tional and cultural transmission -
this offers an account of the role 
(albeit with Piaget, a relatively minor 
one) that traditions and education play 
in conceptual development. 
Piaget is rather vague, if not unconvincing, in the 
emphasis he places on the factors (c) and (d). It is 
here specifically that Russell 's propositions gain 
significant utility for an exhaustive theory of cog-
nitive development and it is the author's opinion that 
any analysis of cognitive development within a Piagetian 
framework is incomplete without the incorporation of 
Russell's proposals. 
3.2 RUSSELL'S PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATI ONS 
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Russell's pedagogical implications can be see n as 
building on the foundationary implications offered 
by Piaget. Russell points towards a necessary con-
sideration of the activity of the child himself, to 
realise a pedagogy that will significantly tran s form 
the subject. The idea of functional interests i mplies 
a voluntary or freedom-of-choice nature being allowed 
to the subject and which must be inherent in the design 
of any educational programme. Furthermore, Rus sell's 
concern with the conceptual system points towards an 
awareness of the concepts valued/central to the concep-
tual system in which the child is being cognitively 
socialised into. More importantly, any educational 
programme must be tailored towards the meeting of in-
dividual needs - making use of the individual's 
functional interests to create motivation. 
Many of Piaget's and Russell's implications coincide 
with the principles underlying the 'progressive' or 
open education movement. The major principles of this 
school are (a) a celebration of individuality and the 
belief that such individuality thrives best where it is 
least fettered, and (b) the belief that pupils k now best 
what they want to learn and learn best what they want 
to know. 
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This progressive 'child centered' approach sees knowledge 
as action, resulting from the child 'doing'. It em-
phasises the need to develop the child's potentials via 
activity on the part of the child himself, rather than 
forcing adult techniques and ideas on the child by 
treating him as a passive empty object that needs to 
be filled with knowledge. Thus, the emphasis here, as 
in Russell, is in freedom of choice, giving functional 
interests rein. 
The primary role of education can be seen as preparing 
the individual to cope adequately with the world, giving 
him adequate strategies of survival; the ability to 
cope and adapt to a rapidly changing world in a creative 
and flexible manner. The 'progressive' educationalists 
claim that contemporary education is not achieving this. 
The knowledge explosion which is causing much change so 
rapidly in industrial societies, prevents one from being 
able to say much about the nature and demands of con-
temporary society in twenty or thirty years hence/by 
the time a pupil is 25 years old most of the mathematics, 
grammar, history, economics inter alia which he learnt 
at school will be out of date. The emphasis of any 
pedagogy should be thus on cognitive development - the 
development of cognitive structures, rather than filling 
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a subject's head with learnt facts (which Carl Rogers, 
like Piaget, calls 'learning in the narrow sense'). 
Postman and Weingartener (1969) point out that the best 
that can be said of an ex-pupil, taking for granted 
that he is able to remember most of what he is taught, 
is that he is a walking encyclopedia of outdated infor-
mation. 
The significance of Piaget and Russell lies in their 
challenge to contemporary education. Postman and 
Weingartener (1971) point out some frightening things 
that children are possibly learning in contemporary 
schools today: 
a) that passive acceptance is a better 
response to ideas than any active 
criticism; 
b) that discovering knowledge is beyond the 
power of the individual students (it 
comes from the teacher!); 
c) that recall is the highest form of intel-
lectual development; 
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d) that the voice of authority is to be 
trusted and more valued than independent 
judgement (obey the principle now and 
the prime minister will be obeyed later!); 
e) that feelings are irrelevant to education; 
f) that there is always a single right 
answer to a question; 
g) that english is not history, and history 
is not mathematics, that sciences are 
major subjects whilst art and music are 
minor subjects. That a subject is some-
thing that you 'take' and when you've 
taken it then you have 'had it'. If 
you've had it, then you are immune and 
need not take it again - what Carl Rogers 
calls the "vaccination theory of education". 
Carl Rogers, being a member of the progressive school, 
points out that the a i ms of an educational programme 
are: 
1) to show a person how to learn, how to teach 
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himself; 
2) to reduce alienation through an under-
standing of technology; 
-3) to produce a fully functioning person; 
4) to produce a person who has a social 
conscience and who is an active member 
of society. 
Rogers , in looking at learning, claims that humans have 
a natural potentiality for learning, and that signifi-
cant learning takes place when the subject-matter i s 
relevant to the individual. Much of what is learnt 
is acqui red through doing- through action - and any 
learning which involves a change in the perception of 
oneself is threatening and tends to be resisted. 
Learning is facilitated when the subject participates 
responsibly in the learning process, i.e. when learning 
is self-initiated and self-evaluated. Furthermore, 
the most socially useful learning in the modern world 
is learning of the process of learning; a continual 
openess of experience and incorporation into oneself 
of the process of change. 
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Although, as mentioned earlier, Piaget distinguishes 
between cognitive development and the process of learn-
ing much of what Rogers has said can be realised in 
Piagetian theory of cognitive development, specifi-
cally in its implications to pedagogy. Where the 
'progressive' movement appears to have fallen down, in 
a Piagetian point of view, is in lOOking at learning 
as the basic unit of analysis, whereas it should trans-
cend this to look at cognitive development and mental 
structures. 
"Consequently our hypothesis is that the 
so-called aptitudes of "good" students 
in mathematics or physics etc., consist 
above all in their being able to adapt to 
the type of instruction offered them, where-
as students who are "bad" in these fields, 
but successful in others, are actually able 
to master the problems they appear not to 
understand - on condition that they approach 
them by another route. 
What they do not understand are the "lessons" 
and not the subject". 
(Piaget, 1973, p.14) 
... /Many 
- 76 -
Many methods used in teaching today are psychologically 
archaic insofar as they rest on merely factors such as 
the simple transmission of knowledge; teachers, ideally, 
should attempt to grasp the "natural" psychogenetic d e -
velopment of the logico-mathematical operations involved 
in cognitive development with specific reference to the 
subject matter being taught. 
... , experiments that we have been ab l e " 
to carry out on the development of mathe-
matical and physical ideas have demonstrated 
that one of the basic causes of passivity 
in children in such fields, instead of the 
free development of intellectual activity 
they should provide, is due to the insuffi-
cient dissociation that is maintained be-
tween questions of logic and numerical or 
metric questions. In a problem of veloci-
ties, for example, the student must simul-
taneously manage reasoning concerning the 
distances covered and the lengths utilised, 
and carry out a computation with the numbers 
that express these quantities. While the 
logical structure of the problem is not 
solidly assured, the numerical considerations 
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remain without meaning, and on the contrary, 
they obscure the system of relationships 
between each e lement .... This is again an 
example of the error risked by believing in 
the innate logic of the child, whereas logic 
is built up step by step through his activi-
ties " . 
(Piaget, 1973, p.99) 
Blocking the reasoning powers of the pupil can thus occur 
in many varied ways. What is required then to obtain 
the fullest satisfaction is a closer association between 
p e dagogical analysis and psychological analysis. 
Cognitive development, as seen with Russell's mod ifi-
cations, is tied intimately to functional interestS. 
A person develops cognjtively in areas that are relevant 
and interesting to him - the subject is in a sense 
choosing areas in which he will cognitively develop. 
As the subject develops and discovers the world v ia 
action, the role of the teacher comes under fire. Holt 
(1976) being also a member of the progressi ve school, 
views that contemporary educational systems are character-
ised by coercion - that the functions of the contemporary 
school are to, firstly 
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shut children out of the adult world; and 
secondly, 
to rank them as winners and losers via the 
process of labelling and streaming. 
The school creates winners and losers to fill positions 
that society requires. The school also has to persuade 
the losers (provide the rationale) that their state of 
affairs is necessary and that the school's way of 
picking winners and losers is just and fair, that the 
losers in fact deserve to lose. 
In opposition to this, Holt claims the teacher should 
have a role of facilitator/guide and should attempt to 
assist the child in furthering his/her inquiry into the 
world - the child is encouraged towards self-discovery 
by asking his own questions and then answering them. 
Children are thus viewed by the progressive educational-
ists as being very curious, resourceful, energetic and 
capable explorers of the world around them. The con-
temporary school is seen as destroying the individual's 
creativity and ability to learn, and consequently muff-
ling the process of cognitive development by making pupils 
afraid of not doing what other people want, of not pleasing, 
of making mistakes, of failing and of being wrong . 
.. . /It 
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It is interesting to note that A S Neill of Summerhill 
fame, a psychologist influenced by Freud, also held many 
similar views to the progressive educationalist movement. 
It is obvious that much of what progressive e ducational-
ists propose for pedagogy is supported by Piaget's and 
Russell's theory of cognitive development. The most 
important point that piaget offers for an educ ational 
programme is a criterion of success - it is not in the 
ability to memorise numerous facts, or to perform in a 
certain way, but rather to develop cognitively - to 
develop cognitive structures necessary for psychological 
and emotional stability that enable the individual to 
cope creatively with ever changing social conditions and 
forces of living. However, a critisism to be levelled 
at the progressive educationalists is that t hey remain 
at the micro~level of analysis and fail to consider the 
wider role of social institutions as existing in a dia-
lectical relationship with the educational institution. 
At this point, Russell's proposals of the conceptual 
system become important. 
3.3 AIMS OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
The aim of this research is to attempt the development 
of a programme that will facilitate change in conceptual 
development, promoting intellectual growth, via the 
... /vehicle 
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vehicle of Piagetian theory. Piaget advances the 
view that intellectual growth takes place through the 
everyday transactions that the individual enjoys with 
the physical and social environments. The aim of this 
programme can be seen as a psychological therapeutic 
process - in the clinical sense this is always direct-
ed towards the restoration of the individual to normal 
everyday transactions with people and society; a 
process of placing the individual in a position where 
he can avail himself of the normal and beneficial growth 
processes. 
It is felt that certain peoples, because of various 
historical and physical incidents, find themselves out-
side of the mainstream transactions that lead to tech-
nological intellectual growth as it is usefully e mploy-
ed in industrial, technological societies. The program-
me of development can be seen as being a psychological 
therapeutic process in that the aim is to place the 
individual (who finds it difficult to cope with in-
dustrial or scientific concepts) into the mainstream 
of transactions in order that he/she may be able to, 
through a certain 'self-help' process facilitated or 
encouraged by the therapeutic programme, advance con-
ceptually towards an understanding of Western techno-
... /logical 
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logical/scientific thought. Obviously the programme 
focuses on the cross-cultural interface and the clos ing 
of the gap in scientific conceptual development between 
industrialized and non-industrialized societies - em-
phasising a purely voluntary participation on the part 
of the subjects. In other words, the programme will 
be used by those who are not content with their level 
of conceptual development and wish to experience cog-
nitive advancement. 
It is proposed that to put an individual into the main-
stream of transactions requires Piagetian theory and 
an understanding of Russell's proposals - particularly 
a consideration of what he terms functional interests, 
which will focus the individual's consciousness of 
those elements and areas that would otherwise be ig-
nored. This process will be achieved by adhering 
strictly to Piaget, thus enabling a diagnosis of where 
the individual is in terms of the level of his concept-
ual development (i.e. pre-operational, concrete opera-
tions inter alia). This will entail the analysis of 
scientific concepts to attempt to find a profile of 
conceptual development. This profile will be matched 
with expected levels of subjects in advantaged Western 
technological societies performance/development. It 
... /is 
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is important to note that such a facilitatory programme 
is not aimed at accelerating the cognitive development 
of individuals such that they may realise formal reason-
ing at an earlier age or a quicker rate than Piaget 
outlines. It is specifically aimed at those who can 
be viewed as 'stage retarded' or behind the levels of 
development as outlined by Piaget, bearing in mind 
that Piaget's outline is viewed as ideal. 
The development of such a programme necessitates the 
consideration of three specific aims. These are: 
1) The development of a body of theory that 
can assist towards the therapeutic inter-
vention and the facilitation of cognitive 
growth; 
2) The realisation of a diagnostic battery 
that is useful to provide insight into 
the individual's level of conceptual develop-
men t and p roblematical areas, and to in-
dicate how the programme is to be tailored 
to individual needs; 
3) To provide a precedure of intervention 
... /whereby 
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whereby the facilitation of conceptual 
advancement can take place. 
Let us look at these three specific areas in more de-
tail. 
3.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BODY OF THEORY 
The need to look at Russell stems from the fact that 
Piaget underestimates the degree to which circumstances 
can alter the rate of conceptual development. Further-
more, it has already been realised that Piaget is not 
adequate in his catering of consciousness no" the con-
ceptual system, seeing cognitive development as an in-
evitable necessary process without any role given to 
the awareness and functional interests of the individual. 
It is proposed, having considered Russell, that a notion 
of functional interests is particularly important to 
any programme considering cognitive development. These 
functional interests are what the individual wants and 
is interested in doing. Thus it follows that in a 
programme such as this, if the programme can make full 
use of functional interests then, by necessity of the 
nature of the individual's cognitive system, the indivi-
... /dual 
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dual will be motivated towards realisation of the 
goals of the programme - this being conceptual growth. 
More importantly, the functional interests mark the 
most important areas with which the programme should 
start operating. It is in this sense then that the 
therapeutic intervention is particularly "individually 
centered" in that it looks specifically at the function-
al interests of each individual using them towards in-
tellectual growth in the individual. 
The author proposes that functional interests provide 
us with the only adequate vehicle through which we can 
'break into' the individual's cognitive system in a 
creative manner. If, as Piaget proposes, equilibration 
of mental structures remains a function of totally non-
conscious mechanical functioning of mental machinery, 
then proposing a developmental programme such as this 
would boil down to a hit-and-miss affair - there would 
be no way of knowing concisely in which conceptual area 
the programme should begin, nor is there any guarantee 
that the subject's motivation is being constructively 
utilised. As mentioned previously, Piaget eliminates 
the role of the subject (apart from his acting on the 
world). Consequently, it may be possible that this is 
a salient reason for facilitatory programmes of cogni-
... /tive 
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tive growth, operating on a purely Piagetian model, 
realizing that although it is possible to advance cog-
nition from one level to another, training only results 
in what is termed specific transfer. 
Specific transfer implies that where in a facilitatory 
programme, an individual is trained in a specific con-
cept, the advancement that occurs remains limited to 
that particular concept - there is no general advance-
ment in other conceptual areas, which would be the case 
in non-specific tranfer. Lawson & Wollman (1976) in 
an attempt to encourage a transition from concrete op-
erations to formal cognitive functioning, found that 
instruction with a Piagetian design (i.e. concentrating 
on the realisation of transformations) can affect the 
transition from concrete to formal cognitive functioning 
and that experimental groups performed significantly 
better than control groups on specific transfer tasks, 
but results were not significant in non-specific trans-
fer. This implies that although the training was 
effective in promoting formal thought with regard to 
one aspect of f o rmal reasoning, it was limited in ex-
tent. 
The aim of this research is to realise a programme that 
... /will 
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will facilitate non-specific transfer in cognitive 
growth, and it is proposed that this can be realised 
by catering for individual functional interests in the 
therapeutic programme, and by capitalising on them in 
a particular way. 
The next question is how can we use these functional 
interests? It is proposed that wh ilst employing 
Piaget's levels of cognitive development to diagnose 
where the individual lies in cognitive growth, i.e. at 
pre-operational, concrete or formal operations, these 
levels can be broken down further so as to reflect the 
individual's functional interests by analysing various 
scientific concepts. Thus, what is intended is the 
development of a histogram (profile of conceptual de-
velopment) reflecting the differing stages of develop-
ment as outlined by Piaget. 
If, for example, an analysis is being made of the indi-
vidual's profile in the conservation of area, vol ume 
and number, the individual is given Piagetian tasks 
to discover the stage of development he is at within 
each concept. Thus it may be found that the individual 
being predominantly at a pre-operational level is more 
advanced in the conservation of volume than area. A 
... /profile 
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profile is built up detailjng the cognitive development 
of the individual, looking in a simplified form, some-
thing like the following: 
Figure 1 
Stages 
Area Vol. No. CONCEPTS 
In the light of Russel's justification of functional 
interests, it is proposed that those concepts in which 
the individual is found to be most advanced (i.e. the 
modal areas of the histogram) are in fact the reflect-
ions of the individual's functional interests within 
his cognitive system. 
Having discovered the areas in which functional interests 
lie, the programme of intervention is then able to pro-
ceed by focussing on the advancement of conceptual deve-
lopment in these areas of functional interests, in an 
attempt to reach what can be termed a critical point, 
where the individual, in order to continue advancing in 
the specific conceptual area of interest must begin to 
develop his cognition in other related conceptual areas 
which is the remainder of his profile. Thus 'critical 
... /points' 
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points' imply instances at which Piaget's notion of 
horizontal decalage comes into being. It is proposed 
that in this manner of advancing functional interests 
to a critical point thus inducing horizontal decalage, 
non-specific transfer will be achieved. Furthermore, 
once the individual has equilibrated his cognitive 
structures by the process of accommodation allowing 
advancement in the other conceptual areas, the pro-
gramme can continue the cycle inducing the individual 
to advance in the new area of functional interests in such 
a manner that the process is repeated. The aim is to 
encourage convergent reconstruction of cognitive 
structures by the individual towards the next level of 
cognitive operations and cognitive growth. 
3.5 THE REALISATION OF A DIAGNOSTIC BATTERY 
Piaget provides numerous tasks for a comprehensive 
range of scientific concepts that can be emp loyed in 
a diagnostic battery and in the procedure of inducing 
cognitive growth. However, the diagnostic battery 
cannot be compiled of random, non-related scientific 
concepts. Let us recall that Piaget sees the facili-
tation of cognitive growth as being possible provided 
that the structure one wishes to facilitate can be 
supported by more elementary logico-mathematical 
... /structures. 
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structures. The implication of this for any facili-
tatory programme is that one should work within a 
specific scientific concept that can be reduced to 
simpler conceptual elements. By reducing to simpler 
concepts it becomes possible to work with pre-opera-
tional reasoning, whilst the actual concept may require 
formal reasoning. This allows a programme to use a 
specific complex concept and work anywhere from pre-
operational reasoning. The present research will be 
working specifically with the concept of force, as it 
lends itself adequately to the inclusion of simpler 
concepts whilst at the same time is a formal reasoning 
concept . Furthermore, once the individual is able to 
understand the concept of force (mechanics), he is 
thereaf ter on the road toward being able to get to 
gr ips with more complex concepts such as heat (energy), 
light-waves, electricity and the like. 
Let us analyse how force is reduced to its component 
concepts: 
a) Force = Mass x Acceleration 
b) Acceleration 
c) Ve locity = 
= Velocity 
Time 
Distance 
Time 
or 
Distance 
Time' 
d) Distance requires a relative understanding of 
the concept of length 
... /~ Length 
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e) Length requires a relative understanding 
of the concept of space 
f) Space requires a relative understanding 
of the concept of mass 
g) Mass requires the conservation of weight 
and of substance - which Piaget v iews as 
being intuitive to a certain extent at the 
pre-operational level. 
The profile of conceptual development in a programme 
designed towards the facilitation of cognitive growth, 
using the concept of force will look as follows: 
Figure 2 - PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Stages of Development 
Formal 
Ccncrete 
Pre-
operational 
_____ oLevel of CCrrplexity _____ ~" 
X (Complexity 
of functional 
interests) 
- 91 -
The line (X l represents the degree of 'complexity of 
functional interests' and stems from Russell's "in-
terest-accommodation" model where he points out that 
functional interests develop in complexity, isomorphic 
to the accommodation of more complex structures. In 
other words, the child is interested in that of which 
he has some understanding. Thus as the individual 
progresses in cognitive growth towards the comprehen-
sion of more complex concepts, so his functi o nal in-
terests will progress. Theoretically then, if a 
point is taken on line 'X' of the conceptual profile, 
the subject should have a substantial accommodation of 
concepts to the left of that point, but not of those to 
the right of that point. 
Functional interests are continually changing with the 
process of growth which implies that in the process of 
the facilitation programme, when the 'critical point' 
is reached in following functional interests and the 
individual develops on other conceptual areas, function-
al interests will also change and the programme must 
then cater for and exploit these new interests. Under-
standing the concept of force requires formal reasoning, 
thus a pre-operational individual could not be expected 
to have functional interests in the properties of force, 
... /bu t 
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but he will be interested in space and length. The 
programme is simply using these interests in the more 
elementary areas to facilitate cognitive growth and 
interests in more advanced areas, which, in turn can 
then be used to facilitate further cognitive growth. 
The distance that instruction must go within the area 
of any particular concept remains inherent in the con-
cept itself, as will be seen when a closer look is 
taken at Piaget's analysis of the concepts that will be 
used in this therapeutic programme . 
3.6. A PROCEDURE OF THERAPEUTIC INTERVENTION 
Piagetian theory provides an adequate procedure of 
intervention, when combined with the use of the pro-
posed diagnostic battery that will allow the develop-
ment of a conceptual profile of the individual. There 
are three major guidelines that can be deduced from 
Piaget when considering his pedagogical implications: 
"First, provide a child with learning 
opportunities that are commensurate with his 
level of cognitive development. Commensu-
rate activities may be defined as activities 
that are far enough in advance of a person's 
present level of functioning to be motivating 
. . . /but 
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but not so much in advance that they will 
be frustrating. Because tempos of deve-
lopment vary from person to person, indi-
vidual appraisal of a person's current 
level of functioning is necessary to deter-
mine the individually appropriate level 
for reasoning activities. Second, after 
a student is provided with cognitively 
appropriate activities, he must then do 
the interacting - you can't do it for 
him.... In addition the teacher provides 
questions that challenge reason and 
thought, questions that motivates a per-
son to explore and to thrust a bit 
further .... Third, for a teacher to 
ass ume the role just described he or she 
must be trained in Piaget's theory of cog-
nitive development; that is the teacher 
must know how development proceeds and what 
characterises a child's past, present and 
succeeding levels of cognitive functioning. 
The teacher also must have knowledge of the 
reasoning assessments used by the Geneva 
group and be skilled in providing opportuni-
ties for the pupil to apply reasoning to 
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ongoing problem situations". 
(B. Stephens, 1977, p . 139) 
It is interesting to note that the evolution of the 
science curriculum over the past 50 years is character-
ised by three major stages (Appel, 1977). The first 
stage can be seen as being fact-centred, characterised 
by text books and teacher/lecture demonstration methods. 
The second stage has a process-structure focus, with 
the influence of Piaget resulting in the "inquiry" and 
"discovery" methods. The third stage (which Appel 
claims we are just beginning to enter) is individualised 
in terms of instruction and interdisciplinery in terms 
of science content. The goal that has emerged for stage 
three science teaching is termed "scientific literacy", 
which can be seen as the ability to look at a situation 
from a scientific point of view or as a functional under-
standing of natural phenomena. Thus, realisation of 
the goal of scientific literacy also implies the re-
alisation of cognitive development. 
"It is not possible to be scientifically 
literate ... at the level of pre-operational 
thought, or even at the level of concrete 
operations. In order to understand 
. .. /natural 
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natural phenomenon to the degree where 
judgements can be made concerning the 
proposed actions of the scientific 
community, or of the legislature, one 
should be functioning at the level of 
formal operations. Thus not only has 
Piaget provided us with a basis for 
choosing science content and the se-
quence of it, but also from his theory 
has evolved another long range goal; 
encouraging the development of formal 
operational thought". 
(Appel, 1977, p.190) 
Appel thus points towards a stage III science programme 
termed the "Personalised Approach to Science Education" 
(PASE) . This programme is individualised by the 
following procedure: 
a) Children are placed in a programme at a 
level consistent with their own levels of 
cognitive development; 
b ) Children progress at their own rates of speed; 
•• • /c) Children 
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c) Children are evaluated individually by 
means of problem centred activities that 
they choose to complete; 
d) Children choose the lessons they wish 
to do; 
e) Children keep track of their own progress. 
(Appel, 1977, p.193) 
The envisaged therapeutic programme of this research 
includes and transcends all that Appel focuses on in 
the PASE approach, for the instruction procedure would 
follow the PASE programme very closely in that it 
clearly exploits Piaget's pedagogical implications. 
However, it would transcend PASE, not only individualis-
ing the procedure of instruction by catering for indi-
vidual needs and interests, but also attempting to 
provide a conceptual profile that allows for an immediate 
diagnosis of individual needs and functional interests. 
The proposed therapeutic programme remains strictly 
Piagetian in its use of a battery of Piagetian tasks 
(in this case, those tasks that are related to the 
conceptual elements of the concept of force) . The 
.. . /tasks 
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tasks are built into a battery, applied, observed and 
measured in the method that Piaget describes, being ad-
ministered to the subject by beginning with the most 
simple (i.e. substance) working forwards to the most 
complex (i.e. force) so that a profile of conceptual 
development of the subject can be realised. Once 
the profile has been realised, the area of instruction 
is decided upon and intermediate goals set. Piagetian 
tasks relevant to the area of instruction are employed 
for content matter. The method of instruction would 
be similar to PASE principles, concentrating on the 
active participation of the subject, with the role 
of the instructor being that a facilitator, guiding 
the subject towards the discovery of transformations. 
The instruction pattern would particularly follow Smeds-
lund's (1964) implications of creating cognitive con-
flict in the subject to induce cognitive reorganisation-
but in the particular area of the functional interests 
of the individual. By working in the areas of functional 
interests the individual should, in theory, entertain 
a certain self-motivation towards participating in the 
procedure and the achievement of cognitive growth. 
The goals of such a procedure can be outlined as follows: 
... /1) to 
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1) to facilitate cognitive development and 
'scientific literacy'; 
2) to develop the ability to use and apply 
theoretical models; 
3) to develop the individual's analytic 
ability; 
4) to motivate the individual towards action, 
trying out ideas, making decisions and 
the realisation of self management, self 
motivation and self confidence. 
3.7. A CONSIDERATION OF LANGUAGE 
Any programme intending to operate at the cross-
cultural interface must give consideration to the role 
of language. Piaget allocates a minor role to language 
in cognitive development and a l though this research 
modifies Piaget's point of view by considering the im-
portance of the conceptual system, the consideration 
given to language here remains closely allied to Piaget's 
theory. Piaget sees the individual's logic as being 
constructed by the individual, and not as the result of 
any transmission through language. In other words 
... /Piaget's 
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Piaget's view is that one cannot understand the mean-
ing of a word unless one has already constructed the 
necessary structures that would allow one to procure 
meaning from a word. 
The view held in this research is that there does exist 
a 'social logic' which is to be found in the conceptual 
system. However, this cannot simply be adopted by the 
individu~l - he must construct and discover it for him-
self - there is, so to speak, a discovering of something 
that is already there. The conceptual system then can 
be seen as functioning almost as a guide and verifier 
of what the individual discovers and constructs as 
logic and knowledge. 
The language used in the testing situation is kept at 
a very simplistic level (as can be seen by the types of 
questions asked in the tasks - c.f. forthcoming descrip-
tions of tasks, chapter 4), using words that young and 
mature subjects can cope with. All questions are open 
ended in that they allow the subject, whatever his 
linguistic capabilities, to explain as best he can what 
he thinks to be the case. 
In this light it is felt that even though the research 
. .. /concerns 
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concerns itself with the cross-cultural interface 
there should be no serious language barriers, as long 
as there is adequate interpretation . Ideally the ex-
perimenter/facilitator should be fluent in the language 
of the cultural group that he is dealing with. In this 
research a skilled interpreter will be employed to 
interpret precisely what the experimenter says, and 
what the subject says. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EXPERIMENT 
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INTRODUCTION 
The present study does not attempt an empirical analysis 
of the diagnostic battery but takes the form of a pilot 
study exploring whether the diagnostic battery does, 
in fact, reveal a useful conceptual profile unique to 
each individual, and what character the profile takes 
on. 
Subjects were not chosen at random, but on their avail-
abili ty to be tested. A total of twentyfour subjects 
were tested - 12 whites (6 males and 6 females) and 
12 blacks (6 males and 6 females) - with the aim of 
trying to achieve conceptual profiles that could be 
broadly classified into three areas, these being; 
a) profiles revealing evidence of formal 
thinking 
b) profiles revealing evidence of predominantly 
concrete operations, 
c) profiles revealing evidence of predominantly 
pre-operational thinking. 
. .. /In 
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In order to achieve profiles in these three areas, the 
first subjects tested in either racial group were of 
mature ages (in terms of scientific literacy), working 
backwards towards subjects of younger ages. Thus 
white subjects ranged between the ages of 6 years and 
26 years old, and black subjects between the ages of 
15 years and 54 years old. The black subjects tested 
were considerably older than the white subjects as 
Grahamstown can be considered to be essentially rural, 
lacking an extensive industrial or technological en-
vironment. 
The testing procedure for each task followed the method 
and design outlined explicitly by Piaget in his descrip-
tions of the tasks and the types of questions put to 
subjects. 
After the subjects had been tested on all of the tasks, 
they were asked which of the tasks in the battery they 
found the most interesting, which tasks they found the 
least interesting, which tasks they liked, and which 
tasks they disliked, in an attempt to see of their 
responses related to the characteristics of their 
conceptual profiles in terms of the proposed theory 
of the relationship of functional interests . 
. .. jAll 
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All interviews were recorded on tape and then transposed 
into a conceptual profile. A skilled interpreter was 
used for all interviews with black subjects. 
- 104 -
4.1 CONSERVATION OF SUBSTANCE 
Piaget points out that the conservation of substance is 
a necessary prerequisite to the conservation of quali-
ties such as volume and weight. How then does a child 
conserve a substance well in advance of its attributes? 
This is only possible by virtue that the child initially 
views substance as an undifferentiated and global 
quality. Thus conservation of substance represents the 
simplest possible quantification of qualities which 
distinguishes it sharply from the measurement of more 
complex and differentiated qualities such as weight and 
volume. 
Substance is quantified before its attributes because 
it provides the child with an undifferentiated quality, 
from which the child can then advance to the special 
qualities that become quantified in the very course of 
their differentiation. As opposed to object permanence, 
where the problem of conservation is to establish the 
invariance of shape or size, t he conservation of s ub-
stance requires the grasp of the invariance of the 
support of that which makes up t he substance of the 
object. When an object is changed into different shapes 
and dimensions the permanence of its substance can only 
... /be 
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be grasped through neutral ising these different 
qualities (i.e. shapes and dimensions). This process 
requires the division of the object into homogeneous 
parts. In this way substance becomes a quantum as 
soon as the substantial quality is considered invariable. 
The conservation of substance can be seen as presupposing 
an implicit adoption of atomism. 
Briefly then, the conservation of substance marks both 
the beginning of the quantification of qualities and 
the completion of the construction of objects. Piaget 
outlines four major stages in the development of the 
conservation of substance, weight and volume. 
4.1.2 METHOD 
The subject is handed a ball of plasticine, together 
with a lump of the same material. He is then asked to 
make another ball 'as big and as heavy' to the ball he 
was given. Once the subject is satisfied that the 
two balls are identical, the demonstrator changes the 
shape of one of them by rolling it into a coil shape, 
sausage shape, by flattening it into a disc, or by 
cutting it up into pieces . The demonstrator then asks 
the subject if the two ob jects still have the same 
quantity of matter, weight and volume etc. The subject 
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is expected to justify his answers to enable determina-
tion, not only whether he accepts the idea of conserva-
tion, but also how he substantiates it. 
4.1.3. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
STAGE 1 - The absence of conservation 
This stage reflects a total failure to grasp the con-
servation of substance, weight and volume even with very 
slight deformations in shape. In this stage subjects 
are convinced that the quantity of matter increases or 
decreases with all changes in shape. They appear to 
have no criterion for deciding in favour of increases 
rather than decreases. The choice varies from one 
subject to another. The subject's answer depends on 
whether he focuses attention on the differences in 
thickness, length or diameter, etc. 
Stage 1 subjects are not yet in full possession of 
quantifying operations and thus fail to grasp the 
conservation of matter. When subject s in this stage 
justify an increase or decrease in the quantity of 
matter, they confine t hemsel ves to invoking just one of 
the relations in question - i.e. "it is longer", 
"thicker", or "flatter", etc., and they completely ignore 
.. . Iother 
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other relations. They do not realise that the dif-
ferences cancel out once they are co-ordinated into a 
total system. Furthermore, they are uncertain as to 
whether th~ distorted ball can be restored to its 
original state, and when they are, they view this 
process in purely empirical terms and not in terms of 
rational reversibility. 
STAGE II - Towards the conservation of substance 
Stage II sees the discovery of the conservation of 
substance, but not of weight and volume. Sub-stage 
IIA is characterised by reactions that oscillate 
between those characteristic of stage I and those of 
Sub-stage lIB, where the conservation of substance is 
invoked immediately as a logical necessity. 
SUB-STAGE IIA - Intermediate reactions between non-
conservation and the conservation of substance 
This stage reflects the problems of conservation - there 
exists a conflict between direct experience or percep-
tion and rational operations. If the subjects of this 
stage rely on perceptions alone they tend to argue 
like subjects of the previous stage. As soon as they 
stop relying on appearance and reflect on the transfor-
.•. /mations 
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mations they are forcibly lead towards the conservation 
of matter. In this stage they tend to vascillate 
between reliance on perception and transformations. 
Piaget points out that the two operations that lead 
them there are identification and reversibility. 
Identification refers to the idea that 'nothing has 
been taken away or added' to the transformed ball. 
Identification alone cannot lead to conservation, but 
only when reversibility enters the scene (i.e. direct 
and inverse operations - operational thinking). With 
true reversibility, the return to the starting point 
appears to the subject as a logical necessity, and not 
merely as an empirical possibility. Reversibility 
means that the subject has grasped that the operations 
that were responsible for the transformations are 
reversible. 
SUB-STAGE lIB - The conservation of substance 
In contrast to sub-stage IIA, the operational mechanism 
overrides perceptive intuition, and the conservation of 
matter is acknowledged under all circumstances - unlike 
the conservation of weight and volume which only occur 
later. In other words, at this stage, although the 
distorted ball is seen as containing the same amount of 
plasticine and can be restored to its original shape, 
... /subjects 
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subjects tend to argue that the distorted ball is of an 
increased or decreased weight or volume. 
SUB-STAGE IIIA - Intermediate reactions between non-
conservation and conservation of weight 
Again here can be distinguished an intermediate group 
who deny the conservation of weight from those who 
affirm it a priori as a logical necessity. Vascilla-
tion in this stage can be demonstrated as follows -
"the plasticine sausage is heavier because a little 
extra has been put in (i.e. the sausage has been 
elongated), but it does not weigh any more because 
nothing has been added". Thus true reversibility has 
not been grasped, and the invariance of weight is not 
discovered. The subject experiences conflict between 
his grasp of the conservation of substance and his 
perceptive intuitions, as related to the quantification 
of weight. 
SUB-STAGE IIIB - The conservation of weight and of 
substance but not of volume 
In this stage, weight becomes divorced from the percep-
tive intuition of the object (subjective), to the object 
itself. In other words the quantification of weight is 
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fused with the conservation of substance - the in-
variance of weight is conceived as a logical necessity. 
Stage IV (IVA and IVB) deals with the conservation of 
volume and will not be discussed here, as it is not 
directly related to the concept of force and thus is 
not included in the diagnostic battery. 
- 111 -
4.2. CONSERVATION OF SPACE 
Piaget makes a distinction between perceived space and 
conceived space. Perceptual recognition of spatia l 
relationships begins in the sensorimotor phase. 
In itially topological relationships are perceived and 
eventually with the recognition of object permanence 
and constancies of size and shape, the child comes to 
recognise projective and euclidean spatial relationships. 
On ly discussed here, for the diagnostic battery, are 
euclidean spatial relationships as they are more com-
plex than topological or projective spatial relation-
ships. The euclidean concept of space rests on the 
concepts of parallels, angles, proportions and the 
conservation of distance and measuremen t. Euclidean 
space is thus a vast network wh ich embraces all objects 
and merely consists of relations of order being applied 
simultaneously to all three dimensions. Within this 
network, each object is linked with others in three 
directions (left-right, above-below, and before-behind), 
along parallel lines of one dimension whilst intersec-
ting the other two dimensions at right-angles. In 
other words, objects are located into a three-dimension-
al reference system of vertical and hor i zontal co-ordi-
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nates. This reference frame is not simply composed 
of relations of order between various objects, but also 
applies to the positions the objects occupy, which 
enables the relations between objects to be maintained 
as invariant despite any potential displacement of the 
objects. Piaget points out that this frame of reference 
constituting euclidean space can be likened to a 'con-
tainer' which is relatively independent of the mobile 
objects that are 'contained' within it. 
4.2.2. METHOD - THE HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL AXES 
The simplest reference frame of the physical world is 
provided in the horizontal and vertical axes. The 
task here is then to compel the subject to make 
reference to these natural axes in order that his 
conceptual reference frame can be investigated. 
Concept of the Horizontal 
The subject is shown a frame housing two identical 
bottles that can be tilted to any degree around a 
central point. One bottle is half filled with a 
coloured liquid. The other bottle contains a piece 
of card - representing the liquid in the alternate 
bottle - identical in colour and amount to the liquid . 
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The card can be revolved around a central point such 
that it can parallel any angle of the level of liquid 
with relation to how the bottle is tilted. 
The subject is initially shown both bottles and how to 
manoeuvre the coloured card in the second bottle. 
Care is taken to make the subject realise that the 
coloured card represents the liquid in the other 
bottle. The experimenter covers the liquid so that 
the subject is unable to see it, and tilts both bottles 
in the same direction to equivalent angles. The subject 
is then asked to move the coloured card in the alternate 
bottle to show the new position of the liquid. The 
bottle containing the liquid is then uncovered, and ' 
the level of the card is compared with it. 
The experimenter can then tilt the bottle containing the 
liquid to various angles in full view of the subject, 
and then handing the subject a set of outline drawings 
of the bottle that correspond to the positions that 
the bottle was tilted to, asking the subject to draw the 
position of the level of the liquid in each diagram. 
Care is taken to ensure that each diagram illustrates 
a line, representing the edge of the table in such a 
way that this horizontal, directly perceived, can assist 
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in judging the position of the liquid. 
Figure 3 - The frame and bottles 
concept of the Vertical 
The subject is shown a mountain of plasticine and asked 
to plant posts 'nice and straight' on the summit, on 
the ground nearby, and on the slopes of the mountain. 
It is important to make clear to the subject what is 
meant by 'straight' and 'sloping'. The subject is 
also asked to draw the mountain, showing the posts 
either 'nice and straight' or sloping. The subject 
may also be asked to draw houses and trees on the 
..• /mountain. 
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mountain. 
4.2.3. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
STAGE I - Inability to distinguish surface or planes, 
in the case of either fluids or solids 
In this stage subjects are unable to distinguish planes 
as such. They think of the fluid in the bottle in 
purely topological terms - as merely something inside 
the bottle - and not according to euclidean concepts 
such as straight lines, planes, inclinations or 
dimensions. Thus fluid levels are not shown in a 
line or as a plane figure, but as a blot or closed 
figure inside the bottle regardless of its true posi-
tion. With the posts on the mountain, subjects tend 
to draw them lying on the mountain, in proximity with 
the slope. Some lie flat along the slope whilst 
others are placed in random fashion inside the outline 
of the mountain. Houses are attached to the mountain 
slope by their side walls; whatever their mode of 
arrangement, objects are never placed vertical. 
The reactions of this stage indicate a total absence 
of horizontal-vertical co-ordinates, which is due 
initially to a total disregard for orientation of 
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objects, because as yet there exists no relations 
applying to empty space. 
SUB-STAGE IIA - Water level shown parallel with the 
base of bottle and trees perpendicular to the mountain 
side 
When the subject learns to abstract the surface of the 
liquid as a plane and locate the posts to the mountain-
side, he still fails to grasp the orientation of the 
fluid in a titled bottle or the posts to an inclined 
slope. He thinks of the fluid as moving towards the 
neck of the bottle, not by displacement, but because 
it is expanding and increasing in volume; it is be-
cause of this increase that the fluid draws nearer the 
neck as the bottle is tipped, while the surface remains 
parallel to the base. Subjects of this stage do not 
notice that the level remains horizontal. Furthermore, 
these subjects are only slightly influenced by the out-
come of the experiment when it is performed before them; 
they constantly assert that the level remains parallel 
to the base of the bottle. However, subjects of this 
stage are beginning to use straight lines and planes 
under certain conditions. Trees and posts are drawn 
perpendicular to the slope; the concept of right-angles 
begins to emerge as a suppliment to the concepts of the 
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plane and the parallel. 
SUB-STAGE lIB - Intermediate types of response 
This stage marks responses midway between those of 
stage IIA and the gradual discovery of the horizontal 
and the vertical. Here the subject begins to indicate 
the direction the liquid will move when the bottle is 
tilted. They can shift the liquid from its position 
parallel to the base of the bottle, so that the liquid-
line is no longer rigidly linked to the tilt of the 
bottle. As they still do not have a system of reference 
to base their picture of the liquid when it is no longer 
parallel to the base of the bottle, nor how to determine 
the angle between the level of the liquid and the sides 
of the bottle, they attempt to relate the liquid to the 
corners of the vessel. Only when the bottle is com-
pletely inverted is there correct judgement, since the 
liquid is once again parallel to the base . The concept 
of the horizontal is still beyond subjects of this stage 
owing to their inability to use references external to 
the bottle. 
with the concept of the vertical, subjects tend to place 
posts and trees vertical on the mountain, but in their 
drawings still show them as e ither perpendicular to the 
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slope or somewhere between the perpendicular and the 
vertical. In other words the vertical is reproduced 
in some situations and not in others because in each 
different situation he bases his judgement on a dif-
ferent system of reference without realising it. Thus, 
at this stage, the concept of the vertical is not con-
ceived in operational terms, but is merely intuitive, 
being governed by the perceptual context. 
STAGE III - The discovery of the vertical and horizontal 
At this stage the subject gradually begins to make use 
of reference systems, constructing co-ordinate axes which 
embrace the entire spatial field. There esists an 
intermediate stage between stage lIB and stage IlIA, 
where the subject discovers the horizontal when the 
bottle is lying on its side, together with partial dis-
covery of the vertical. This indicates a widening of 
the limited system of reference with which the subject 
was previously satisfied. with the discovery of the 
horizontal the level of the liquid is no longer drawn 
parallel with the base, or joined to one corner. 
SUB-STAGE IlIA 
This stage is marked by the trial and error constructions 
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of vertical and horizontal axes. Subjects are able 
to recognise the horizontal and the vertical but only 
succeed in making this elementary comparison upon 
repeated attempts - often after reproducing the same 
errors as those seen in stage II. Thus the concepts 
of horizontal and vertical are not constructed at the 
beginning of stage III but during the actual course 
of this stage; i.e. not until these operations have 
been tightly organised into a system. 
SUB-STAGE IIIB 
This stage sees the subject making use of references 
from parts of the object; the construction of the 
horizontal and vertical is formulated in operational 
terms and is applied directly to all situations. 
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4.3. CONSERVATION OF DISTANCE 
Piaget points out that the concepts of distance and 
length are psychologically two quite different situations. 
Consequently they must be analysed separately. Distance, 
in Piagetian terms, refers to the linear s e paration of 
objects - to empty space - whilst length refers to 
linear size of objects such as the size of stic k s or 
the paths along which one walks. Logically these con-
cepts are interdependent, as distance can be seen as 
the length of an interval or empty space betwe en objects, 
and length is the distance taken up by the object. 
Piaget asks whether children recognise this interdepen-
dence at the outset of development, and if not, how they 
come to its realisation. Developing notions of distance 
enables the child to pass from the elementary topo-
logical relations of space to the more complex 
euclidean relations. 
Piaget views the reconstruction of distance as a problem 
that is separate from both perceptual estimate s and 
measurement; it is a condition of measurement in itself. 
Distance is not isotropic to perceptual space in that 
it represents a deduction that follows fr om knowledge 
of the order of points and an understanding of t he 
intervals between the points in relation to the order 
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of points. 
4 . 3. 2 . [1ETHOD 
Two figures (trees), identical in height are set out on 
the table at an interval of approximately 50 cm. The 
subject is asked simply whether the trees are 'near one 
another' or 'far apart'. Care is taken not to refer 
to movement or distance travelled. The trees should 
remain in the same place throughout the experiment. 
Once the subject has replied that the trees are either 
'near' or 'far apart', a screen is placed between them. 
The screen is a little taller than the trees which re-
main in their previous positions. The subject is then 
asked whether the trees are still as 'near' or as 'far 
apart', depending on his previous reply, and he is asked 
to give reasons for his reply. The screen is removed 
and replaced with other objects such as a screen with 
a 'window' in it, a large cube that is higher than the 
trees, several 'bricks' which are lower than the trees 
and form a 'fence' between the trees, and by covering 
the whole interval with bricks to make a 'carpet' 
between the trees. 
The question of symmetry is raised by asking "Is it as 
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near or as far (using the subject's own formulati o n) 
from there to there (AB - a tree to an object) as it is 
from there to there (BA - the object back to the same 
tree?)". The experimenter runs his finger along the 
distance AB and BA to avoid misunderstanding. The 
subject is then presented with two figures where one 
(B) is twice as high as the other (A). The subject is 
then again asked if, as the objects face each other, 
if B is as near to or as far from A, as A i s to B. 
Lastly, the subject is presented with two figures where 
one is raised 50 cm above the table level so that they 
are now at different levels. Any mention of climbing 
up or down is avoided. 
if AB = BA. 
The subject is again as k ed 
4.3.3. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
STAGE I - Absence of overall distance 
In this stage, subjects do not bring together the two 
distances of AS, BS (A and B representing trees, S the 
screen/ mediating object) such that the distance re-
l a tion between A and B has no meaning when the o bject 
is interposed. Furthermore, the distance re lati o n s hip 
is asymmetrical (AB, BA) when the objects A a nd Bare 
on different horizontal planes and even sometimes when 
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they are on the same plane. 
Subjects cannot join the two intervals of AS and SB to 
obtain an overall distance, because intuition is ir-
reversible - resulting in operational composition also 
being impossible - such that once something has been 
broken into its parts, it cannot be reconstructed as 
a whole. Distance is an empty space; an interval 
that is free from objects, and thus as soon as an object 
S is interposed between A and B, there is no longer a 
distance relationship between A and B. The subject 
is unable to compose the distance relations of AS and 
BS because the object S is in the way. 
with the symmetrical property of distance (AB = BA), 
two situaitons must be distinguished. Where A and B 
are on the same horizontal plane, subjects fail to 
understand whether the distance from A to B as be ing 
the same as B to A because their conception of the re-
lations of order is not reversible. In the alternate 
situation, where one of the objects is higher than the 
other, either by being taller or situated higher, 
distances seem greater in an upward than a downward 
direction. Most subjects judge the distances of the 
objects from themselves, thus failing to compare the 
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distance of AB and BA. 
STAGE II 
This stage presents the core of the problem in the con-
servation of distance. Subjects are able to compare 
the reciprocal distances between A and B with the inter-
posed object S, however, they maintain that the overall 
distance (AS + BS) must vary with the thickness of S. 
Furthermore, a difference in height between A and B 
demands a belief that the distance between the objects 
is asymmetrical. 
SUB-STAGE IIA - Non-conservation of overall distance, 
distance relations asymmetrical 
Here, as in stage I, subjects lack a co-ordinate system 
with which they refer to objects which occupy 'room', 
or unoccupied space. The first stage in the construc-
tion of this system is to recognise that although solid 
objects may be placed in various positions, each of 
them must occupy a particular 'site' which remains 
constant, (as noted in the conservation of space). 
Furthermore, a simultaneous grouping of relations of 
order and change of positions is required before sub-
jects can compare lengths and distances. In this stage, 
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subjects do not compare lengths and distances - here 
subjects make judgements of the lengths of objects in 
terms of the order or positions of their boundaries 
and judge distances in terms of intuitive intervals 
between objects. Failure to conceive of a constancy 
between the 'sites' of objects and empty spaces leads 
to their non-conservation of distance. 
However, unlike subjects in stage I, here subjects 
begin to construct an overall relation of the distance 
b~tween objects A and B instead of being totally con-
fined to the relations of each of the figures A and B 
and the screen S. This is not indicative of an opera-
tion because they are still sure that the introduction 
of S alters the distance between A and B. All subjects 
believe that the distance is reduced by an amount that 
is equal to the width of S. In addition, as in stage 
I, the distance between AB and BA is perceived as 
asymmetrical. 
SUB-STAGE lIB (TYPE A) - Non-conservation of overall 
distance. Distance relations symmetrical 
In this category, like subjects of stage IIA, distance 
and length is considered as being heterogeneous with 
distance referring to empty spaces and length to solid 
.•. /objects. 
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objects. Thus the interposition of S between the 
end-points of A and B leads to a non-conservation of 
distance. However, subjects recognise the symmetrical 
character of the interval and the equality of the dis-
tances AB and BA. In other words, whether A and Bare 
the same size or situated on the same horizontal plane 
or not, subjects are aware that AB must equal BA. 
SUB-STAGE lIB (TYPE B) - Conservation of overall dis-
tance. Distance relations asymmetrical 
Subjects of type A discover the symmetry of the intervals 
AB and BA before the conservation of distance, whilst 
subjects of type B make these discoveries in the re-
verse order. Here the conservation of distance AB 
with the interposed S is recognised, but they fail to 
agree with this when A is higher than B, or when they 
are asked to compare the distances AB and BA. 
Although the conservation of overall distance and the 
symmetry of intervals are interdependent concepts at 
stage III, initially these concepts develop independent-
ly (hence the differences that can occur with type A/ 
type B in sub-stage lIB); at the level of intuition 
there can be progress in one of these areas without a 
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corresponding progress in the other. 
STAGE III - Conservation of distances 
Responses at this stage show the conservation of 
distance between two sta t ionary objects (A and B) what-
eve r objects are interposed as S. Distance is recog-
nised as being the same in both directions of AB and 
BA. There is a realisation that the d imensions of 
solid objects are a part of distance. 
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4.4. CONSERVATION OF LENGTH 
Central to measurement is the notion that objects re-
main constant in size despite any changes in position. 
Conservation of length can be seen almost as an ela-
boration of the operational system constructed for the 
conservation of distance. As in the conservation of 
euclidean space and distance, where the subject must 
construct a system of 'sites' (which acts as an inde-
pendent medium) that can be filled with objects, the 
conservation of length can only be realised if the 
'site' of an object maintains constant size when it is 
left empty and when it is occupied by an object. Thus 
not only is a stable system of relations between objects 
established (i.e. the relations of distance) but also 
a system that holds the length of objects constant 
when objects are moved. 
4.4.2. METHOD 
The subject is shown two straight sticks, identical in 
length and about 5 cm long, with their extremities 
facing each other. The subject is asked to confirm 
that the sticks are of equal length. One of the sticks 
is then moved forward 1 or 2 cm, and the subject is 
asked which of the two sticks is longer or whether they 
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are of the same length. At all levels the sticks are 
judged equal before being staggered. 
4.4.3. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
STAGE I 
Subjects of this stage are concerned, when comparing 
these lines, exclusively with their end-points. Both 
ends of the sticks are not taken into account simultan-
eously, which implies that they are unconcerned with 
the intervals of length existing between these end-
points. Changes of positions as conceived at this 
stage, lead to the non-conservation of length. The 
path of movement is thought of only in terms of the 
point of arrival, without any reference to the point of 
departure and the interval between the departure and 
arrival points being made. Consequently the lengths 
of the objects themselves change as a function of their 
end-points. 
SUB-STAGE IIA 
This stage demonstrates all the intermediate responses 
between stage I and stage lIB. Again after a change 
in position, subjects maintain that the stick which 
has been moved forward is longer, thinking only in terms 
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of the further extremities and ignoring the nearer 
extremities. 
SUB-STAGE lIB 
This stage shows what Piaget calls an 'intuitive regu-
lation' taking place, which relates to the decentration 
of attention - subjects begin to take into account all 
extremities of the sticks, rather than concentrating 
only on the leading extremities. However, even where 
the subject begins to recognise that the sticks are 
equal, he may not regard them as being equal to what 
they were before. Some subjects come even closer to 
conservation by noting that the sticks are equal when 
in exact alignment with each other, but deny this 
equality when one stick is positioned at an angle of 
45 degrees from the mid-point of the other. In other 
words, the conservation of length is being guessed 
intuitively, without it being regarded as a logical 
necessity. 
SUB-STAGE III - Comparison of length. Two straight 
lines staggered. Operational conservation 
In this stage a reference system of stationary sites 
and moving objects is constructed. Conservation of 
length now becomes a logical necessity applied in all 
instances. 
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4.5. CONSERVATION OF TIME 
To determine time, an appeal must be made to causal 
operations, i.e. a chain must be established between 
causes and effects, by explaining the latter in terms 
of the former . Time can be seen as the co-ordination 
of motions at differing velocities; consequently the 
construction of time begins with a correlation of 
velocities. The operational co-ordination of these 
motions - physical and human motions - leads to the 
construction of the concepts of physical and psycho-
logical time. Although the development of psycho-
logical time involves physical time as the co-ordina-
tion of action performed at different rates implies 
that some work has been done initially, psychological 
time can be seen to be mainly of a qualitative kind, 
whilst physical time is of a more quantative nature. 
Operational time logically requires that the relations 
between simultaneity, succession and duration must first 
be constructed. 
4.5.2. METHOD - THE EQUALIZATION OF SYNCHRONOUS 
DURATIONS AND THE TRANSITIVITY OF EQUAL TIME RELATIONS 
For this diagnostic battery, the relations of simultane-
ity and duration will be analysed. Piaget shows that 
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even when a child appreciates that two bodies start 
and stop simultaneously, he does not necessarily con-
clude that their motions are of equal duration. To 
analyse this, a large vessel (reservoir) is allowed to 
empty through a tapering tube that yields two identical 
jets of water. The water is collected in bottles of 
different shapes and dimensions. Both jets of water 
are controlled by a single tap such that the water can 
be clearly seen to start and stop running simultaneously. 
Thus, if the two bottles are of the same shape and 
dimensions, the water will rise to the same level in 
both. In this case the equality of the synchronous 
durations is generally recognised. However, if the 
two bottles do not have the same shape, the equal 
quantities of water do not rise to the same l evel and 
subjects of lower conceptual development will deny the 
equality of time that the water was allowed to flow 
into each bottle. In this task, questions are asked 
about the synchronization of the flow of the water, 
the equality of the durations of flow, and the relations 
between time and the amount of water run out. 
Before the tap is turned on, the subject is asked which 
of the two dissimilar bottles will be filled more 
quickly and if it would take more or less time to fill 
than the other. When water in one of the bottles (A) 
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has risen to Al (and the water in the alternate bottle 
has risen from Bo to Bl ; where Al and Bl represent 
equal quantities of water), a second question is asked 
regarding simultaneity: 'Did the water start and stop 
flowing at the same time from both tubes?' A third 
question, 'Did the water take some time to go from here 
(A ) to there, and did it take the same, or more or 
o 
less time to go from Bo to Bl ?' 
Care is taken to make sure that the subject fully under-
stands that the two flows are simultaneous, by the ex-
perimenter pointing out and getting the subject's 
agreement that the water started and stopped flowing 
into the bottles at the same time. Once this is 
agreed, a fourth question is asked : 'Is there the same 
amount (or the same water) in here (Ao - AI) as there 
is in there (Bo - Bl ), or is there more water in one of 
the bottles?' To check the answer given, the subject 
is asked: 'If this water (AI) is poured into B' 
(another vessel identical to B) how high would the 
water rise? If we poured t his water (B l ) into here 
(A') how high would that rise?' A fifth question is 
then asked: 'If this water (AI) is poured into L (an 
elongated tube) and that lot (B l ) into L'(L = L '), 
would it rise to the same height or not?' 
. . . /Finally, 
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Finally, to check the transitivity of operationally 
constructed relations of time, a sixth question is 
asked: 'If X takes the same time to fill as Y, and 
Y takes the same time to fill as Z, does X take as 
long to fill as Z, and do they contain the same amounts 
of water?' (where X, Y and Z represent flasks of 
different shape but the same capacity). 
Figure 4 - Reservoir and Bottles 
4.5.3. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
STAGE I - Failure to grasp simultaneity and synchroni-
zation, and failure to quantify flow 
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This stage shows the most primitive reactions of failure 
to grasp simultaneity and synchronization and above all, 
a complete inability to quantify the flow of water 
(the work done). Subjects in this stage, although 
realising that the opening/closing of the tap starts/ 
stops the flow of water into each bottle, are never-
theless unable to accept the simultaneity of the end of 
the flow. Piaget points out that failure to grasp 
simultaneity goes hand in hand with a failure to syn-
chronise durations because the subject thinks of time 
as belonging to each action separately, and furthermore, 
that actions can only be co-ordinated by their results 
(i.e. the work done). However, as results cannot yet 
be quantified, they cannot serve the subject as object-
ive criteria by which he can judge time durations and 
intervals etc. Duration is thus evaluated by the re-
sults of an action (in this case the levels of the 
liquid - irrespective of the size of the bottles). 
These results do not depend on the interval between the 
starting and finishing points, but merely on the finish-
ing point alone. 
SUB-STAGE IIA - Inverse relation between time and 
velocity and correct prediction of the filling rate as 
a function of the size of the bottle; simultaneity but neither 
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synchronization of durations nor correct quantifica-
tion of the flow of the liquid 
Subjects at this sub-stage usually succeed in answering 
the first two questions correctly, but none of the 
others. Thus, at this stage, subjects recognise simul-
taneity and by divorcing time from velocity predict 
intuitively that the larger of the two bottles will be 
filled more slowly and in greater time. However, they 
fail to synchronise durations with simultaneous start-
ing and stopping points, or to quantify the amounts of 
water run out. In this stage subjects begin to make 
a distinction between the results of the action and 
its duration and consequently they expect the larger 
of the two bottles to take more work to fill than the 
smaller one. Where in stage I, subjects deny simul -
taneity because they centre their attention on the 
rising levels of water and not the stopping of the flow, 
in stage IIA this simultaneous stopping of the two 
water flows is taken into account as well as the rise 
in water levels. This decentration leads subjects 
directly to grasping simultaneity. 
At this stage, subjects are still unable to establish 
the equality of the durations until they have developed 
a conception of quantity that would enable them to re-
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alise the equality of the two amounts of water that 
were run out. 
SUB-STAGE lIB - The empirical discovery of syn-
chronization 
At this stage, subjects succeed in grasping the equality 
of synchronous durations and of the quantities of liquid 
run out, but only after a succession of trials and 
errors. However, this achievement does not imply that 
subjects have fully grasped the idea of synchronization. 
It is not yet an operational construction; it is still 
to an extent intuitive and empirical, lacking in general-
ity. Some subjects may discover the synchronization 
of the durations of the flow of water, and then use 
this to immediately deduce the equality of the amounts 
of water (quantification of the work done), whilst 
other subjects may make this discovery in the reverse 
order; discovering first the equality of the quantities 
of water and then the synchronization of the durations. 
STAGE III - Immediate synchronization and quantification 
This stage reveals the operation construction of the 
relations of time, and demonstrates that the greater 
the grasp of synchronization, the better the quantifica-
... /tion 
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tion of the work done. To ascertain whether a 
subject's responses are operational (and not merely 
intuitive) requires a close examination of the re-
sponses to question six - which poses a problem of 
transitivity. Subjects must construct relations of 
time operationally before they can appreciate that 
the equations of X = Y and X = Z are transitive. 
Piaget points out that none of the subjects he tested 
could solve the problem of X = Z, before they were 
a~le to answer questions I to 4 correctly. 
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4.6. THE CONSERVATION OF SPEED 
piaget claims that the simplest intuition of speed 
and movement rests on an intuition of order; a moving 
object is judged to be faster than another when it 
overtakes it on a path parallel to its own (when it 
was originally behind or side by side of the other 
object according to the direction of travel, and is 
afterwards ahead o f it). 
4.6.2 METHOD - THE SPEED OF TWO MOVEMENTS WHERE ONLY 
THE STARTING AND STOPPING POINTS ARE VISIBLE 
The task used here involves judging the respective 
speeds of two moving objects when the starting and 
stopping points alone are visible. The paths are 
unequal in length, but parallel, whilst r unn ing in the 
same direction and remaining out of sight of the subjects 
(i.e. the use of two tunnels of unequal length). Sub-
jects are shown the two straight tunnels (36 inches 
and 18 inches in length) and two identical toy cars. 
The cars are moved by turning a handle controlling 
two bobbins of differing diameters, winding up nylon 
threads which are attached to the cars. (See figure 5) . 
. .. /Figure 
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Figure 5 - The cars and tunnels. 
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By moving the handle backwards or forwards the cars can 
be moved back to their starting points or onto their 
stopping points. The ratios of the diameters of the 
bobbins allow for differing speeds in the movements of 
the cars such that they are able to start and stop to-
gether whilst travelling unequal distances. 
Subjects are shown the two straight tunnels with the 
cars placed at their entrances (side by side along the 
same starting line). Care is taken to point out to 
the subject the disparity in the length of the two 
tunnels, requesting the subject to point out the longer 
of the two. Furthermore, the subject must be seated in 
such a way in order to keep a watch on the two exits 
and entrances of the tunnels, and he hi mself gives the 
starting signal. The cars are then moved off through 
the tunnels to stop simultaneously at their differing 
stopping points. The questions then asked are whether 
one car went faster than the other; did they travel 
for the same length of time and which car travelled 
the furthest etc. If the subject clearly fails to 
solve the questions on speed, the two movements are 
repeated with the tunnels removed, and when the subject 
has seen which of the two cars was moving faster, and 
has explained why, the tunnel apparatus is replaced 
... /and 
- 142 -
and the original questions put again as before. 
4.6.3. STAGES OF DEVELOP~lliNT 
STAGE r - Failure in comparison of speeds 
In this stage the subject fails to solve the problem 
of the tunnels, even after seeing the cars travel the 
paths in full view. Intuitive solution of speed 
(as opposed to operational solution) is demonstrated 
by the fact that subjects of this stage have no dif-
ficulty in recognising that one of the cars moves 
faster than the other when the cars are in full view 
(with tunnels removed). However, this only holds 
provided the cars are set off simultaneously from the 
same point and travel in the same direction. In other 
words, greater speeds are only attached to visible 
'overtaking'. 
Piaget points out that subjects at this stage, in 
observing the simultaneous stopping of the cars, tend 
to judge the speeds as equal even if one moving car 
is set off after the other from the same starting 
point. Some subjects at this stage claim that the 
car travelling the longer distance takes the longer 
time, even though they have seen the simultaneousness 
... /of 
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return to the experiment using the tunnels they im-
mediately transpose what they have realised and have 
no difficulty in grasping from the length of the bigger 
tunnel that a hidden overtaking is taking place, and 
thus deduce that the object is travelling at a greater 
speed. However, this realisation is not yet operation-
al in that they still think in terms of real overtaking 
and do not correlate the time and space traversed. 
STAGE III - Operational solution of the problem 
In this stage subjects manage to establish the dif-
ference in speeds by immediately correlating the given 
factors of time and the space traversed. Piaget claims 
that even here the criterion of speed is the overtaking, 
but it is an invisible, operational overtaking as the 
orders of succession of 'ahead', 'behind' and 'after' 
are translated into intervals or lengths that are a 
direct result of the translation of the lengths that 
are perceived (in this case the lengths of the tunnels). 
In taking cogniscence of the equality of the synchronous 
durations, overtaking thus beco~es the relationship of 
the space traversed and the intervals of time. Con-
sequently there is no further need to imagine any over-
taking inside the tunnels. The distance travelled 
and the time taken are directly correlate d into speed . 
. . . /4.7. 
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of starting and stopping. 
Intuitions of speed do not consist of relationships of 
distance and time, but rather of perceptions of 'ove r-
taking' which is a practical rather than an intellec-
tual relationship. When the tunnels are replaced and 
the subject is again unable to compare speeds, the 
subject is unable even to imagine the potential over-
taking of " the cars inside the tunnels, as this requires 
a necessary consideration of the idea of lengths and 
their relations to the equal durations (time). 
In general, subjects at this stage, being restricted to 
the field of perception, consider the two speeds to be 
equal by centrating on the simultaneousness of the 
starting and stopping points. 
STAGE II - Intermediate responses 
Subjects of this stage begin as in stage I by judging 
the speeds to be equal, and then gradually move to-
wards a correlation of time and the distance travelled. 
Here, when the subjects see the movements repeated 
without the tunnels, they be gin to realise that as one 
object traverses a greater space than the other, it in 
fact overtakes the other. Consequently the n they 
... /return 
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4.7. UNIFORMLY ACCELERATED MOVEMENT 
Once the subject has successfully conserved operations 
of speed, the way is then open to the acquisition of 
the concept of acceleration. The easiest method of 
studying acceleration is to look at uniformly accele-
rated movement on an inclined plane. The conservation 
of acceleration requires the co-ordination of relations 
of distance, time and speed. 
4.7.2. METHOD 
Subjects are shown two parallel tracks (roads) with 
two identical toy cars. The tracks can be inclined 
independently at either end, to various angles, re-
presenting downhill and uphill slopes. One track is 
then inclined, and the primary question is to find out 
how the car comes down the slope, and if its speed 
always stays the same. Once the subject has dis-
covered that the speed of the car changes as it rolls 
down the slope, the slope is marked with flags at equal 
distances (four intervals) and the second question is 
to discover on which of these intervals the speed of the 
car will be the greatest, and what the relations of 
speed are from one interval to the next . 
..• /Question 
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Question three concerns the decrease in times over equal 
distances. The subject is asked how long the car takes 
to travel the first interval, then the second, the third 
and the last. Finally question four is asked which 
concerns the increase in the distances covered in equal 
times. Here the subject is shown the second track and 
the car again rolling downhill. The subject is told 
that the driver of the car has a watch, and every 
minute, whilst going down the hill, the driver shouts 
'hey'. At every 'hey' a spectator at the side of the 
track plants a flag (four in all). The subject is 
asked to point out where these flags should be posi-
tioned. What is being analysed is the distances the 
subject allocates between the flags. 
Figure 6 - The cars and slopes 
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To check the subject's responses, the opposite ends of 
the tracks can be raised, and the cars allowed to run 
downhill and then up the other side. The same 
questions are asked as before, but this time in relation 
to uniform decceleration. 
4.7.3. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
STAGE I - No acceleration as a function of decent 
Piaget points out that most subjects begin this task 
already having an intuition of acceleration, although 
some subjects do not have any notion of acceleration 
at all. In the latter case, subjects are unable to 
conceive an object as going 'faster and faster' or 
even just 'faster'. They can only entertain an idea 
that an object is moving at speed and that it remains 
constant throughout. In other words, at this stage, 
questions of acceleration are totally meaningless to 
the subject. 
STAGE II - Intuitive acceleration 
This stage is characterised by an empirical intuition 
of acceleration as a function of the incline. Piaget 
claims that this intuition is incomplete as acceleration 
is not conceived here as continuous or regular - there 
.. . /is 
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is no correlation of time with the distance travelled 
subjects are unable to translate their intuition of 
acceleration into relations of time or distance 
travelled (i.e. operational relations of speed). Thus 
in this stage, the subject either believes that the 
times taken for each interval are equal because the 
distances are, or he correlates an increase in speed 
with an increase in time, or he may see the distance 
travelled in the equal time intervals as being less 
and less as the pace gets faster. 
STAGE III - Articulated intuition of acceleration and 
gradual success in correlating times and distances 
successively traversed 
It is to be noted that Piaget makes a division of stage 
III into the finer gradations of sub-stage IlIA and IIIE. 
The responses of subjects in sub-stage IlIA are identi-
cal to those of stage II, however Piaget points out 
that the distinguishing factor is that subjects of 
stage IlIA unlike stage II, know how to correlate 
operationally the distance travelled with the time 
taken when comparing the speeds of two simultaneous 
movements, and they only have to be questioned on 
simultaneous movements and then brought back to the 
question of acceleration for them to begin to answer 
... /correctly. 
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correctly. Thus, to realise this fine distinction 
requires the use of a further task relating to simul-
taneous movements. Consequently, in order to keep 
the diagnostic battery concise, Piaget's sub-stage IlIA 
will be included under stage II, whilst those subjects 
falling in his sub-stage IIIB, will simply be seen as 
stage III and no extra task will be employed. 
Subjects in stage III begin by making the same errors 
as those in stage II (i.e. by correlating equal dis-
tances with equal times and vice versa, or by reasoning 
that the distances traversed diminish regularily with 
increasing speed), but then go on to correct their 
responses spontaneously. It is precisely this cor-
rection that shows that subjects have not yet fully 
succeeded in construing acceleration operationally. 
Their thinking remains, at this stage, more closely 
linked to simple representational imagination. 
STAGE IV - Immediate solution of the problems by 
formal operations 
In stage III, the subject's thinking is tied to the 
concrete - to what is actually there - whilst this 
stage sees the immediate solution of the problem, in-
dicating the capacity of hypothetico-deductive reasoning . 
... /Subjects 
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Subjects of this stage accept without hesitation that 
the time taken for each new equal distance decreases 
and that with each new equal time the distance increases. 
- 151 -
4.8. THE CONSERVATION OF FOaCE 
Although Piaget does not appear to have a particular 
task dealing with the concept of force, the task 
chosen here incorporates the idea of Newton's third 
law of motion which requires force to be operationally 
construed as kinetic energy in relation to work done 
(where work equals force x distance) . 
4.8.2. METHOD - THE TRANSMISSION OF MOVEI1ENTS 
This task looks at the immediate and mediate transmis-
sion of movements from one object to another. The 
task consists of a horizontal bar with eight hooks upon 
which wooden balls suspended on wire, can be hung. 
The balls used are of different sizes (one large ball, 
six medium sized balls, and eleven small balls). One 
small ball is painted a distinguishing colour (in this 
case silver) and the remainder are divided into two 
other colours. All balls are suspended on wires of 
three inches in length except for two small balls, 
where one is suspended by a long wire five inches in 
length and the other by a short wire one inch in length. 
A short wooden ruler (three inches in length) suspended 
horizontally by a wire three inches in length is also 
... /provided. 
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provided. 
The subject is shown the bar with a small ball and the 
silver ball attached to the extremities of the row of 
hooks, and is asked to move the silver ball by not 
touching it, but by using the first ball (already 
attached) and any of the other objects provided. Care 
must be taken to impress upon subjects that the first 
ball plays an essential part in the experiment, and 
furthermore, when subjects unhook the first ball and 
bring it nearer to the silver ball the experimenter 
must immediately return it to the original hook with 
instructions that it should be left there. Whilst 
subjects are engaged on this task, they are asked what 
they would think would happen if they use a large ball, 
a medium sized ball, suspension at different positions 
etc. After various subjects are asked to give an 
account of what they have done and what has been happen-
ing to the objects. If subjects have been unsuccess-
ful they can be finally shown the solution - to suspend 
small balls with the same lengths of wire on all the 
hooks and to strike the first one. The experimenter 
then observes the subject's reactions, i.e. whether the 
use or fail to use the solution when repeating the whole 
experiment. 
4.8.3. STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT 
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Figure 7 - The transmission of movement . 
• ~ 
. , 
. 1 
SUB-STAGE IA - Centration on immediate transmission: 
Subjects of this stage try to use every type of im-
mediate transmission (direct contact between the first 
ball and the silver objective) or some method of ex-
tending the manual action, e.g. by exchanging the 
first ball for one on a longer wire. None of these 
subjects think of using other balls as intermedia and 
thus have no conception of mediate transmission. In 
general when these subjects are shown the solution 
they still fail to grasp mediate transmission. Piaget 
..• /points 
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points out that in this stage when the subject collides 
one ball with another, he tends to forget which one 
started the process which reflects a difficulty in 
realising the order of succession; when subjects be-
gin to pay attention to the order of succession they 
are lead towards the responses encountered in stage lB. 
SUE-STAGE IE - The discovery of q uasi-mediate trans-
mission 
Quasi-mediate transmission refers to the idea of a chain 
of immediate transmissions as opposed to the idea of 
a force that traverses a number of moving objects. 
This stage marks the transition from the absence of 
mediate transmission to the actual discovery of chain 
reactions. Subjects in this stage hook up other balls 
or the rule as intermedia and see, for example, the 
first ball hitting the next and the next hitting the 
following object which then hits the silver objective 
with each action being an independent and successive 
impulse. This demonstrates that before subjects can 
conceive of mediate transmission, they must grasp the 
order of succession of events, thus linking up a chain 
of immediate transmissions. 
Subjects in this stage discover that in using objects 
. .. /as 
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as mediators, they are substituting an action of the 
object for the action of his own - they use the first 
ball as a substitute for the impact of the hand on the 
second object. 
STAGE II - An appeal to mediate transmission 
Subjects of this stage appeal almost directly to 
mediate transmission, however they tend to believe 
that they must use large balls to augment the force 
of the impact. Although the intermediate large objects 
do move, the deliberate selection of large balls suggests 
a failure to grasp the conservation of transmitted 
motion (and consequently an operational construction 
of force as mass x acceleration). 
STAGE III - Operational solution of the problem 
Subjects of this stage hook up intermediate balls of 
equal sizes (and with the same lengths of wire) to the 
small ball as an immediate solution to the problem. 
The most effective solution being to hook up small 
balls on all of the intermediate hooks such that all 
the small balls are touching each other, the first ball, 
and the silver ball. Consequently the minimum amount 
of force applied to the first ball induces movement 
. .. /in 
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in the silver ball. Here subjects conceive of the 
solution as energy (or force) being transmitted through 
the intermediate objects, inducing movement in the 
silver ball. 
4.9 RESULTS 
CATEGORY ONE 
EVIDENCE OF FORMAL THINKING 
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WIN's Profile is fully developed. 
She found the tasks of acceleration and force the most 
interesting and found the tasks of substance, distance 
and time the most boring. 
This profile shows evidence ot formal thinking. 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: CHE AGE: 19 
FEMALE WHITE 
COMMENTS 
CHE found focce and accelecation the most intecesting with 
length and substance the least intecesting. 
This pcofile ceveals evidence of focmal, concrete and pce-
opecational thinking. 
CATEGORY TWO 
EVIDENCE OF PREDOMINANTLY CONCRETE THINKING 
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GAV found the task of force the most difficult. 
He found the tasks of acceleration and space the most 
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This profile shows evidence of concrete and pre-operational 
thought. (Acceleration and force). 
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This profile reveals evidence of concrete and pre-
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SUBJECT: JEN AGE: 19 
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COMMENTS 
JEN reported acceleration and force to be most interesting, 
with the tasks of length and substance being the least 
interesting. 
This profile reveals evidence of concrete and pre-operational 
thinking. 
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JOA found the tasks of force and acceleration the most 
interesting and the task of distance the least interesting. 
This profile reveals evidence of concrete and pre-operational 
thinking. 
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FIGURE 16. 
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COMMENTS 
ROR found the tasks of time the most interesting, without 
finding any tasks particularly uninteresting. 
The profile shows evidence of concrete and pre-operational 
thinking. 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: LIN AGE: 15 
~lALE BLACK 
COMMENTS 
LIN found the task of time the most interesting. 
He did not like doing the task of force. 
This profile reveals evidence of concrete and pre-operational 
thinking. 
CATEGORY THREE 
EVIDENCE OF PREDOMINANTLY PRE-OPERATIONAL THINKING 
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SUBJECT: POR AGE: 15 
FEMALE BLACK 
COMMENTS 
POR found the tasks of space and time the most interesting. 
She disliked the task of force because it was "too difficult". 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational thinking. 
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SUBJECT: BEL AGE:24 
FEMALE BLACK 
COMMENTS 
BEL found the task of time the most interesting, and 
disliked the tasks of force and acceleration because 
they were "too difficult". 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational 
thinking. 
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COMMENTS 
HEA found the task of space the most interesting. 
He did not like the tasks of acceleration and speed 
because they were "too difficult". 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational 
thinking . 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: ELS AGE: 44 
FEMALE BLACK 
COMM ENTS 
ELS found the task of speed to be the most interesting. 
She disliked the tasks of space. 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational 
thinking. 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: JOS AGE:27 
MALE BLACK 
COMMENTS 
JOS found the task of time the most interesting and 
disliked doing the task of acceleration. 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational 
thinking. 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: GLA AGE: 54 
FEMALE BLACK 
COMMENTS 
GLA found thetasks of time, speed and acceleration the 
most interesting. 
This profile reveals evidence of a predominance of pre-
operational thinking. 
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FIGURE 24. 
PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: BUY AGE: 20 
FEMALE BLACK 
COMMENTS 
BUY found the task of time the most interesting. 
She disliked the task of space. 
This profile reveals evidence of predominantly pre-
operational thinking. 
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FIGURE 25. 
PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPME NT 
STAGES 
IV 
B 
III 
B 
II 
B 
I 
'" '" 
t:) r-- >-3 
'" 
:» ..., 
c 
'" 
H M H 
'" 
n 0 
tIl :» 
'" 
Z 3: M n ::0 
'" 
n >-3 Cl M M M n 
>-3 M :» >-3 t:) r-- M 
:» Z :c M 
Z n ::0 
n M :» 
M >-3 
H 
0 
Z 
CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT : REB AGE: 17 
FEMALE BLACK 
COMM ENTS 
REB found the task of time the most interesting. 
She disliked the task of acceleration because it was 
"too difficult". 
This profile reveals a pr e dominance of~e-operational 
thinking. 
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FIGURE 26. 
PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT :PAU AGE: 8 
MALE WHITE 
COMMENTS 
PAU found the tasks of space, time, speed and acceleration 
most interesting. He did not like doing the tasks of 
distance and force. 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational 
thinking. 
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FIGURE 27. 
PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: SHE AGE: 8 
FEMALE WHITE 
COMMENTS 
SHE found the tasks of distance and time the most interesting. 
She did not like doing the tasks of speed and acceleration. 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational 
thinking. 
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FIGURE 28. 
PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: DEB AGE: 8 
FEMALE WHITE 
COMMENTS 
DEB liked the tasks of space and force and disliked the 
tasks of substance and time. It would appear that the 
tasks of time, speed and acceleration had no real conceptual 
meaning for her. 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational thinking. 
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FIGURE 29. 
PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: MIC AGE: 26 
MALE BLACK 
COMMENTS 
MIC found the task of space and time the most interesting. 
He disliked the tasks of speed, acceleration and force 
because they were "too difficult". 
This profile reflects a predominance of pre-operational 
thinking. 
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FIGURE 30. 
PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: ERI AGE: 30 
MALE BLACK 
COMMENTS 
ERI found the concept of force the most interesting. 
He disliked the tasks of speed and acceleration. 
This profile reveals a predominance of pre-operational 
thinking. 
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FIGURE 31. 
PROFILE OF CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
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CONCEPTS 
SUBJECT: MIC AGE: 6 
MALE WHITE 
COMMENTS 
It was difficult to find out from MIC which tasks he found 
most interesting. When asked what tasks he liked doing 
most, he said those of substance, speed and acceleration. 
There were none that he disliked. 
This profile reveals evidence of pre-operational thinking. 
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The following table displays a summary of the most 
advanced area of conceptual development of each subject, 
with the tasks they liked or disliked; found most 
interesting or least interesting. 
Figure 32 - Summary of development and interests 
Name Most advanced 
area 
Formal operations: 
WIN 
ROB 
DWI 
CHE 
Acceleration 
Force 
Acceleration 
Force 
Acceleration 
Force 
Acceleration 
Concrete operations: 
GAV Speed 
BES Speed 
JEN Speed 
Interests/Likes 
Acceleration 
Force 
Acceleration 
Force 
Time 
tion 
Accelera-
Force 
Acceleration 
Force 
Space : 
Acceleration 
Acceleration 
Force 
Acceleration 
Force 
Disinterests/ 
Dislikes 
Substance 
Distance : Time 
Substance : Space 
Distance and length 
Substance and 
length 
Substance : 
Distance : Length 
Time 
Substance 
Length 
••• /JQA 
JOA Speed 
ROR Time 
LIN Time 
Pre-operations: 
Length 
BEL Length 
REA Length 
ELS Length 
GLA Length 
BUY Distance 
REB Time 
PAU Distance 
SHE Distance 
DEB Distance 
MIC Time 
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Acceleration 
Force 
Time 
Time 
Space Time 
Time 
Space 
Speed 
Time : Speed 
Acceleration 
Time 
Time 
Space :Time : 
Speed Accele-
ration 
Distance Time 
Space Force 
Space Time 
Distance 
Force 
Force (because 
'too difficult') 
Acceleration : 
Force (because 
'too difficult') 
Speed : Accelera-
tion (because 'too 
difficult' ) 
Space 
Space 
Acceleration 
(because 'too 
difficult' ) 
Distance : Force 
Speed 
tion 
Accelera-
Substance : Time 
Speed : Accelera-
tion : Force (be-
cause 'too difficult'). 
ERI Length 
MIC Distance 
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Force 
Substance : 
Speed : Accele-
ration 
Speed : 
Acceleration 
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4.10. DISCUSSION 
As this is not an empirical analysis no general state-
ments can be made. However, the results of the pilot 
study appear to reveal the existence of an exciting 
relationship between functional interests and the most 
advanced areas of an individual's conceptual profile. 
This relationship appears to be far mor e complex than 
that previously described (c.f. p. 86). In other 
words, there does not appear to be a simple direc t 
relationship of functional interests to the most ad-
vanced area of the conceptual profile (the most ad-
vanced area of the conceptual profile is taken to be 
that with the highest stage of development. Thus if 
a subject enjoys stage III development in the con-
cepts of length and time, and stage I development in 
speed, acceleration and force; the most advanced area 
of development is in the concept of time). On the 
other hand it appears that functional interests are to 
be found coinciding with the area immediately to the 
right of the concept in which the individual is most 
advanced. 
This cannot be seen clearly with those subjects whose 
profiles are fully developed - although they would still 
appear to support this relationship in that they all 
... /found 
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found the tasks of acceleration and force to be the most 
interesting, wh ilst the simpler tasks, such as substance, 
space, distance etc., to be the most boring - but can 
be seen in most of the profiles revealing concrete and 
pre-operational thinking. For example JEN (figure 13) 
is most advanced in the concept of speed and she found 
the tasks of acceleration and force (in that order) to 
be the most interesting with substance and length the 
least interesting. 
This does not deny that subjects can have interests in 
areas to the left of that area in which they are most 
advanced. Take for example POR (figure 17) who is 
most advanced in the concept of length. She found the 
tasks of space and time to be the most interes ting. 
Space is to the left of the concept of length on the 
conceptual profile, whilst time is to the immediate right. 
On analysis of her profile it can be seen that she is 
atstage lIB in the concept of space - the stage im-
mediately prior to the realisation of equilibration 
and concrete operations in that area - thus it can be 
said that she is still advancing in that area, striving 
for equilibration, and is consequently interested i n 
that conceptual area. Theoretically it could be said 
that POR has a functional interes t in space because 
... / until 
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until she advances in that area towards the realisa-
tion of concrete operations, she cannot make any sign i-
ficant advancement in the more complex areas of speed, 
acceleration and force, even though she is interested 
and advancing in the concept of time. Also to be 
noted is that POR, like most of the other pre-operation-
al thinkers disliked those tasks that were too far to 
the right of the area in which they were most advanced. 
POR said that she did not like the task of force be-
cause it was "too difficult " . This returns us to the 
points made by Phillips (c.f. p. 26) that an individual 
will only be motivated (and thus be interested) in get-
ting to grips with a concept if there is an optimal 
discrepancy between the conflict (c.f. Smedslund p. 25) 
of the environmental inputs and the individual's cog-
nitive structures. Thus if the information is too far 
in advance of the assimilatory/ accomodatory capacity of 
the individual, the result is that the subject becomes 
frustrated (c.f. Stephens p. 92), or totally ignores the 
information. 
From the results it appears that five subjects (ELS, 
figure 20; PAU, figure 25; DEB, figure 27; ERI, 
figure 29; MIC, figure 30) do not support the theoreti-
cal model as well as other subjects. 
. .. / ELS 
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ELS is most advanced in the concept of length, and 
found the task of speed to be the most interesting, 
the task of space the least interesting, with no mention 
being given to the task of time. It may be possible 
that ELS is interpreting what is most/least interesting 
here in terms of the physical a?pearance and attractive-
ness of the tasks, which can be seen more clearly with 
the very young subjects (PAU, DEB, MIC), rather than 
in terms of how cognitively stimulating they are. 
However, it is to be noted that her interest in the con-
cept of speed still lies to the right of her most ad-
vanced area. 
PAU is most advanced in the concept of length and found 
the tasks of space, time, speed and acceleration interest-
ing and the tasks of distance and force uninteresting. 
His interest in space and time are acceptable in terms 
of what has been said previously, but speed and accelera-
tion would appear to be too much to the right of his most 
advanced area, and at the same time, he does not show 
any great advancement in these particular concepts. 
The explanation for his interests in these tasks is 
probably similar to that given for ELS - PAU is a white 
8 year old boy who possibly owns some toy cars - thus 
it may be the toy cars in the tasks of speed and accele-
... /ration 
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ration that he finds attractive and interesting and 
not the concepts themselves. 
occuring with MIC, age 6. 
A similar case could be 
A similar argument could be offered for DEB who found 
the task of force interesting. To be noted here is 
that she disliked the task of substance with her 
justification being 'we don't play with plasticine 
in standard one anymore. We played with it only in 
sub- A' . 
Looking at the responses of these very young children 
to ideas such as 'interesting/uninteresting, like/dis like 
it may be more beneficial, for any empirical investiga-
tion of the relationship of functional interests, to 
work with more mature subjects (e.g. from the age of 
12 years upwards) in an attempt to ensure that subjects 
do not interpret ideas such as 'interesting/uninterest-
ing' in terms of the physical appearance of the task~ 
Furthermore, instead of merely asking subjects which 
tasks they found interesting/uninteresting, they could 
be given a formal questionnaire of high validity and 
reliability that could tap their interests, likes and 
dislikes more effectively. 
. .• /ERI 
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ERI offers a different case. His most advanced area 
of development lies in the concept of length although 
he found the task of force to be the most interesting. 
However, an analysis of his conceptual profile reveals 
that his development in the concept of force as compared 
with speed and acceleration is quite high. Thus just 
as other subjects who show conceptual shortfalls to 
the left of their most advanced area and have interests 
there, it may also work in the opposite direction, as 
with ERI, where there is a relatively high development 
in an area far to the right of the most advanced area 
and where functional interests also flourish. However, 
in terms of the proposed theory of the conceptual pro-
file, it is expected that ERI would not be able to 
make any further significant advances in the concept 
of force until he has advanced in those conceptual 
areas to the left of the concept of force, i.e. time, 
speed and acceleration, and he would possible have to 
transfer his interests to focus more on those tasks to 
the immediate right of his most advanced conceptual area. 
It is interesting to note that many of the young black 
subjects revealed more developed conceptual profiles 
than the older mature black subjects. This returns to 
the point made by Page (c.f. p. 65) and the role of 
... /education 
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education in the promotion of cognitive development, 
and more directly to Russell's focus on the relation-
ship of the conceptual system to cognitive development. 
The conceptual system surrounding the black youth today 
can be seen as different in many ways (particularly in 
the areas of industrial and technological exposure), 
to the conceptual system that surrounded the mature 
blacks in their youth. 
An analysis of the conceptual profiles reveals that 
the battery appears to be tapping individual uniqueness 
in cognitive development. Consequently, the battery 
of tasks not only holds value as a diagnostic tool or 
as a remedial training programme, it could possibly be 
used as a method of selection. Piaget offers so many 
varied tasks dealing with many conceptual areas that a 
battery of tasks could be constructed covering those 
conceptual areas that are required for an individual 
to perform a job or complete a task successfully. 
What would be required to build such a battery is not 
a job description in the traditional form of the level 
of decisions that have to be made, but a job descrip-
tion defining the cognitive operations involved. Once 
this is achieved, it is then a simple matter of putting 
together a particular number of Piagetian tasks that 
... /cover 
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cover the most simple and the most complex cognitive 
operations and conceptual areas. The result would 
be to identify individuals with cognitive ability to 
handle a particular job or task, rather than potential 
1. Q' s and vaguely def ined apti tudes. L'lore impor tantly, 
a Piagetian battery used for any selection process is 
possibly the best way of selecting accurately in the 
cross-cultural interface. (Consider for example, the 
use of such a battery in the selection of black team 
leaders in underground mining gangs who, to ensure 
safety in working conditions, will require a certain 
understanding of scientific concepts). 
4.10 . 1. ADVANTAG~S OF THE PROPOSED DIAGNOSTIC PrtOGRAMME 
The use of Piagetian tasks in a battery as a diagnostic 
tool, a remedial training programme and a potential 
selection process holds various advantages: 
1) It stresses and caters for individual differences 
in cognitive development. 
2) It is a diagnostic process that allows for 
the realization of problem areas (as well as 
positive areas) in an individual's conceptual 
development at a point in time. 
. .. /3) 
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3) It enables a realization of how a remedial 
programme should be designed, where it 
should begin and with what concepts, in 
such a way as to meet individual needs. 
4) It operates on a purely voluntary basis and 
can facilitate self-development by guiding 
the individual into those areas that 
require development. 
5) It attempts to make optimum use of individual 
interests thus maintaining motivation. 
6) The emphasis remains on the creation of 
cognitive structures and operational 
thinking - a focus on understanding as 
opposed to learning. 
7) It aims at non-specific transfer and 
development in all conceptual areas. 
8) By developing cognitive structures within 
a concept such as force, development may 
be allowed to begin in other complex ar e as 
such as heat, light, electricity etc. 
. .. /9) 
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9) Once cognitive structures are 'equilibrated' 
they are lasting. No retraining or 
developmental programme is needed to 
cover similar groups again. 
10) The developmental process once encouraged 
has no end as the individual continuously 
uses what he has gained to get to grips with 
more complex conce~ts. 
11) It can adequately cope with the cross-
cultural interface where other tools 
must be standardised and validated, and 
often changed in format and appearance. 
4.10.2. DISADVANTAGeS: 
1) Time is a significant disadvantage. For 
the present diagnostic battery, interviews 
averaged 40 minutes in duration. Obviously 
the more tasks there are in a battery, the 
longer the interview will take. 
2) Only one individual can be interviewed by 
a facilitator at a time. As this programme 
. .. /is 
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is orientated towards meeting the needs 
of the individual, it could not be ade-
quately administered to groups. 
3) The interviews can only be conducted and 
interpreted by a facilitator who has inti-
mate knowledge of Piagetian theory and 
practise, in order to get accurate informa-
tion and consequently develop reliable 
and valid conceptual profiles. 
4.11. CONCLUSION 
This pilot study has revealed certain valuable hypo-
theses in regard to the relationship of functional 
interests and the most advanced areas of development 
within an individual's conceptual profile. These are: 
1) A bat ter y of Piagetian tasks revolving 
around a complex scientific concept can 
reveal a unique profile of an individual's 
conceptual development. 
2) Functional interests are related to con-
ceptual development in that they generally 
•.. /appear 
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appear to coincide with the next more 
complex concept to that in which the 
individual is most advanced, particularly 
if the individual has reached operational 
thinking in his most advanced area. It 
may be said that functional interests 
transcend that conceptual area in which 
the individual is most advanced, towards 
development in the next most complex con-
ceptual area. 
3) Functional interests may also be found 
to coincide with those conceptual areas 
in which the individual is not fully 
developed, but are at the same time more 
simple than that concept within which 
he is most advanced. 
Overall, these hypotheses point towards the need for 
an exhaustive empirical investigation of the relation-
ship between functional interests and conceptual 
development, and the realization of a tighter body 
of theory that can adequately account for this intimate 
relationship. 
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